Do we start with the 1967 conflict that resulted in Israel occupying Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, along with the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula? Or do we go back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War — what the Israelis call the War of Independence and the Palestinians the Nakba, or catastrophe? Or do we need to rewind further back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a British letter of intent for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”? Or do we go all the way to the First Zionist Congress, convened in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 amidst a wave of anti-Semitism rising across Europe?

The debate about the origins of the conflict goes on to this day. Regardless of the debate, the current situation in Israel and the Palestinian Territories has become unsustainable.

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Israel continues its crippling blockade of Gaza and the occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which Palestinians see as the capital of their future state. When Hamas, the Palestinian faction that controls Gaza, fires rockets into Israel, the Israelis retaliate with what has been described by many as a “disproportionate” use of force. The human rights abuses perpetrated against Palestinians living under Israeli control have led to accusations of apartheid by organizations like B’Tselem and Human Rights Watch.

The construction of Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, which is considered illegal under international law, has made a Palestinian state effectively impossible. At the same time, an estimated half of the Palestinian population lives outside Palestine. Millions of refugees and their descendants — most of whom were exiled in 1948 — are stuck stateless in camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. The wider Palestinian diaspora is scattered around the world.

With the peace process at a stalemate following years of failure, the end to this conflict is nowhere in sight.

In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to Avi Shlaim, professor emeritus of international relations at the University of Oxford and author of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.” He explains what lies at the core of the conflict, the problem with the peace process, apartheid, US support for Israel and more.

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: At some media outlets, there is often a lack of historical context when it comes to Israel and Palestine. Some readers may think that the conflict began in 2021 with the recent clashes or in 1967 with the Six-Day War. If you had to explain the origin of the conflict, what would you say? Where do the roots lie?

Avi Shlaim: The core and the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has been going on for over a century. There was one land and two national movements: the Palestinian national movement and the Jewish national movement, or the Zionist movement. Two peoples, two nations and one land. This is what the conflict is about.

In the late 1930s, the neighboring Arab states intervened in this conflict on the side of the Palestinians. They remained engaged in varying degrees until President Sadat of Egypt visited Jerusalem in 1977, signed a peace treaty with Israel and led the trend towards Arab disengagement from the conflict. So, there are two levels to this conflict, two dimensions: the local one, the Jewish-Palestinian, and the interstate level of the conflict.

The great turning point of the conflict was 1948, which Israelis call the “War of Independence” and Palestinians call the Nakba, or the catastrophe. The outcome of this war was that three-quarters of a million Palestinians — more than half of the population — became refugees and Palestine was wiped off the map. These are the real roots of the conflict.

The next turning point was the Six-Day War in June 1967. In the course of that war, Israel trebled its territory. It captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. From now on, the Arab states had a direct stake in this conflict. They wanted to recover their occupied territories. In 1979, Israel gave back the Sinai Peninsula as the price for the peace treaty with Egypt. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed the Oslo Accord. The Oslo Accord did three things: the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist, Israel recognized the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people, and the two sides agreed to resolve all their outstanding differences by peaceful means.

Edward Said was the first Palestinian to launch an all-out attack on the Oslo Accord. The reason for this was that the Oslo Accord addressed the 1967 file but not the 1948 file. It was an agreement between Israel and the PLO  about the Palestinian territories captured by Israel in 1967. It did not deal with the roots of the conflict: the rights of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and the collective right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination.

Siddique: There is a long-running debate over whether the solution lies in two states — one Jewish, one Arab — or one democratic state for both peoples. I know your view has changed over time from a two-state to a one-state solution. What led to that?

Shlaim: For most of my adult years, I supported the two-state solution. The two-state solution did not offer the Palestinians absolute justice, but in world affairs, it is very rare to get absolute justice. It offered them relative justice or the most minimal national rights. It took the 1967 borders as the basis for a settlement between Israel, on the one hand, and an independent Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, with the capital city in East Jerusalem. This would have left Israel with 78% of Mandatory Palestine and the Palestinians would have only 22%. So, by signing the Oslo Accord, the PLO made a far-reaching concession and agreed to settle the conflict in return for a very small state alongside Israel.

There has always been, and there still is today, broad international support for a two-state solution. But that doesn’t take account of Israeli actions since 1967.  Israel did not stand still after the victory. Since July 1967, Israel has been building settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. It withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005, but it continues to expand Jewish settlements on the West Bank even as we speak. If Israel had been serious about a two-state solution, at the very least it would have imposed a freeze on settlements to give negotiations a chance. But Israel continued to expand settlements. Settlements are about land-grabbing. Land-grabbing and peace-making don’t go together — it’s one or the other. By its actions since 1967, Israel indicated clearly its preference for land over peace with the Palestinians.

Another problem is that the Israeli so-called security barrier on the West Bank. The wall is not complete yet, but it’s already 650 kilometers long. The Palestinians call it the apartheid wall. The International Court of Justice has ruled that the wall is illegal. Israel would have been perfectly within its rights to build the wall on its side of the 1967 border, but most of this wall is on the Palestinian side. They say that good fences make good neighbors, but not when the fence goes down the middle of your neighbor’s garden! The wall annexes between 8% and 10% of West Bank territory to Israel and the wall goes around East Jerusalem and cuts it off from the West Bank. East Jerusalem has been annexed by Israel. The Palestinians in East Jerusalem don’t have citizenship, they have permanent residence, which is fragile and vulnerable and can be terminated at any moment by Israel.

To sum up, there is no longer the physical and geographical possibility of a viable Palestinian state. All that is left is an archipelago of Palestinian enclaves surrounded by Israeli settlements and Israeli military bases. In other words, Israel, by its actions on the ground, has killed the two-state solution, which was the solution that I used to favor.

Since Israel eliminated this option, what is the alternative? The best alternative I can think of is one democratic state, with equal rights for all its citizens, regardless of religion, gender or ethnicity. I do not regret the shift towards the one-state solution. What is wrong with a one-state solution with equal rights? It is a democratic solution. And what could be a nobler vision than a state that does not discriminate against any group and in which all citizens enjoy the same rights?

Siddique: Marwan Bishara, the senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, has spoken of whether the Palestinians need a Nelson Mandela-like figure. In such a scenario, an Israeli leader would also need to extend an arm. Yet this view doesn’t take into account the friction and opposition in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, nor does it address the influence of US politics and lobby groups. What would need to change for there to even be talk of a one-state solution — a democratic state for Arabs and Jews?

Shlaim: Palestinian leadership has always been a problem. Abu Mazen is a very weak leader: inarticulate, lacking in charisma, and lacking in legitimacy. So, he’s not a very convincing proponent of Palestinian national rights. Sadly, throughout their history, the Palestinians have had poor leadership, starting with Haj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, then Yasser Arafat and then Abu Mazen. So, that is a problem: poor leadership on the Palestinian side.

But that is not the principal problem, because Abu Mazen is a moderate and the great majority of Palestinians are for a two-state solution — or at least they used to be. After the Oslo Accord was signed, roughly 70% of Palestinians and 70% of Israelis supported a two-state solution. But Oslo failed the Palestinians. The situation now is worse for the Palestinians than it was before Oslo.

What is the obstacle to one, democratic state? The main obstacle is the Israeli government: the Likud and parties further right than the Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Under American pressure, in the Bar-Ilan speech in 2009, Netanyahu said he would accept a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israeli. Since then, he has gone back on it and he has stated repeatedly that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch — he will oppose a Palestinian state all the way. More importantly, the Likud platform rejects a Palestinian state. The Likud has never accepted the need for a Palestinian state.

Further to the right is Naftali Bennett, the leader of Yamina, who replaced Netanyahu as prime minister in June 2021 at the head of a hybrid coalition. Bennett used to be the head of Yesha, the settlers’ council. He’s a religious-nationalist who fiercely opposes an independent Palestinian state in any shape or form. He used to advocate the outright annexation of Area C, which is 60% of the West Bank. 

In the present Knesset, 72 out of 120 members are right-wingers. This reflects a long-term trend. Israeli society has been moving steadily towards the right ever since the Second Intifada in 2000. Today, not just the government, not just the political elite, but Israeli society in general are strongly opposed to a one-state.

Siddique: You talked about Benjamin Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett, which leads me on to my next question. In 2013, you wrote that Netanyahu is “the double-faced prime minister who pretends to negotiate the partition of the pizza while continuing to gobble it up.” You have talked today about the problems with Oslo, including Edward Said and his criticism of the accord. Since the failure of Oslo, has Israel ever been interested in a peace deal, or has it been focused on eating that pizza and making a Palestinian state impossible?

Shlaim: Netanyahu never concealed his deep hostility to the Oslo Accords. After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Likud came back to power in 1996 under the leadership of Netanyahu, who set about dismantling, freezing and subverting the Oslo Accord and building more settlements and strengthening Israel’s military power in order to continue to subdue the Palestinians indefinitely. In the last few years, Netanyahu’s message to the Israeli public has been that Palestinian nationalism has been effectively contained and neutralized and that the Palestinians are powerless, divided — with Hamas in charge of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in charge of the West Bank — and therefore, there is no need to trade land for peace with them. His formula is peace for peace: to offer the Arabs peace in return for peace, without paying any territorial price.

With the help of Donald Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner — who is very close to Netanyahu — Netanyahu was able to implement this policy and it took the form of the Abraham Accords: peace deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. These were great foreign policy triumphs for Netanyahu, and he said to the Israeli public: You see, I don’t have to pay any price — there is nothing the Palestinians can do and we are achieving normalization with the Arab world.

But with the escalation of violence in Israel and Gaza in May, this whole conception of peace has collapsed. The Palestinians did not remain passive. They put up robust resistance to the Israeli provocations in Al-Aqsa and the ethnic cleansing in Sheikh Jarrah, the Arab neighborhood of East Jerusalem.

These provocations eventually led Hamas to respond with rocket attacks. The last round of fighting was not confined to Gaza. There was a sense of outrage by Palestinians everywhere. There were also protests on the West Bank, in East Jerusalem, in Gaza, in the diaspora and, most importantly, within Israel itself.

Since 1948, an Arab minority remained inside Israel. Today, they constitute 20% of Israel’s population. These Palestinian citizens of Israel have the right to vote, but they are treated as second-class citizens. In the past, violent clashes only occurred in the occupied territories. Now, for the first time, clashes occurred inside Israel, particularly in the mixed cities of Jews and Arabs like Lydda. This is a kind of incipient civil war. As a result of Israel’s provocations, we got something like a unity intifada in which all Palestinians, wherever they are, are united in the determination to resist Israel’s occupation.

Siddique: Considering that clashes took place inside Israel, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Gaza was the main focal point, does that mean the peace-for-peace policy is unsustainable?

Shlaim: When he was prime minister, Netanyahu didn’t have a peace policy. Netanyahu does not believe in a peaceful solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. He has never believed in a peaceful settlement. He is the proponent of permanent conflict and he is a unilateralist. He thinks that Israel has to remain militarily strong, Israel has to retain the full support of the United States, and then the Palestinians would be impotent to do anything; the international community can criticize Israel as much as it likes, but there will be no practical consequences — no price for the occupation.

That’s his view. He doesn’t have an endgame, he doesn’t have a solution. His solution is Jewish supremacy based on Jewish military force. This is apartheid, because between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, there is one regime: the Israeli regime, which is all-powerful. And one ethnic group dominates the other. This is not a democracy; it’s an ethnocracy. Another word for ethnocracy is apartheid.

So, that is the position today. Both B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights NGO, and Human Rights Watch issued reports recently with that conclusion: that Israel is an apartheid state. To my mind, apartheid in the 21^st century is not sustainable. The focus in world politics has shifted from borders and sovereignty to human rights. That’s what people feel strongly about. If Israel continues to violate on a daily basis the human rights of the Palestinians, and to oppress them, it will gradually lose international support. This is already happening and it’s been happening for some time.

Israel’s savage bombardment of Gaza in May was a real turning point. It provoked protests around the world against the Israeli occupation and it has led to popular public reframing of the conflict. Before it was seen as a dispute between two parties over territory. Now it is seen as a case of racial injustice. The Palestinian cause became strongly linked to Black Lives Matter. In the demonstrations, people carried banners that said, “Palestinian Lives Matter.” There were posters that said, “Palestine Cannot Breathe.” Americans are beginning to see this conflict as similar to the racial injustice at home, where white policemen shoot and kill black people. That’s the way more and more people see the situation between Israel and the Palestinians.

There is also BDS — the boycott, divestment and sanctions — a global, grassroots, nonviolent movement against the Israeli occupation, which has been gathering more and more support and gaining more traction. Israel is really afraid of BDS and it has led a campaign to discredit BDS and its supporters as anti-Semites, which is rubbish. It is important to stress that BDS is a nonviolent movement and that all its main demands are ground in international law: an end to the occupation, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, equal rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel. Far from being an anti-Semitic movement, BDS is an anti-racist movement that espouses universal values of freedom and equality.

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I have been talking so far about the tide of popular opinion that is turning rapidly against Israel. But the position of Western governments has not changed. The position of the United States, Canada and the European Union is still completely biased in favor of Israel. The European Union, in particular, is really hypocritical because, officially, it supports a two-state solution and is committed to Palestinian rights, but in practice, it gives Israel all sorts of trading privileges and advantages. It does nothing to sanction Israel for its illegal settlements or its abuse of Palestinian human rights.

The policies of these Western governments are not going to change in the near future. Twelve European parliaments have recognized Palestine as a state but only one government, that of Sweden. The Irish parliament recently passed a resolution condemning Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank. The Irish foreign minister stated that the de facto annexation is just as bad and just as illegal as formal annexation. Ireland may well end up proposing EU sanctions against Israel. Let me point out this: Ireland was the first country to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Today, Ireland is ahead of most other Western governments in its support for Palestinian rights. Today, the Irish flag is flying in Ramallah.

I believe that eventually, governments would follow their publics and modify their attitude towards Israel. America, in particular, may come to reassess its blind and unconditional support for Israel.

Siddique: Can all of these factors — Black Lives Matter, looking at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case of racial injustice, the apartheid label, the BDS movement, international public support, the public reframing of the conflict and political shifts like with Ireland — have an impact for Palestinian self-determination?

Shlaim: Growing popular support worldwide is not going to enable Palestinians to achieve independence and statehood. It is governments who make the decisions and the United Nations, which has overall responsibility for resolving international conflicts. But the actor that counts most in this conflict is the United States. Unless America shows real commitment to Palestinian statehood, it is not going to come about.

Since 1967, the Americans have arrogated to themselves a monopoly over the so-called peace process. They have excluded the Soviet Union and then Russia, the EU and the United Nations. They arrogated to themselves a monopoly over peacemaking. But they never delivered peace, they never pushed Israel into a settlement. The so-called peace process was all process and no peace, yielding no concrete results. It was a charade. In fact, it was worse than a charade because peace talks gave Israel just the cover it needs to continue to pursue its aggressive colonial project in the West Bank.

Americans like to think of themselves as honest brokers, but they are dishonest brokers. They are Israel’s lawyer, and you can’t be both Israel’s lawyer and a mediator. More than this, America is the enabler of the Israeli occupation. Without American support, American money, American military hardware, Israel would not be able to sustain the occupation. America gives Israel money, arms and diplomatic support. In the last 40 years, America has used the veto on the Security Council 42 times to defeat resolutions that are not to Israel’s liking. In effect, Israel has the power of veto on the Security Council. It doesn’t exercise it directly but through a proxy, its little friend, the United States of America. The Palestinians are not going to achieve statehood unless America moves from words about the two-state solution to deeds, to condition its support to Israel on real Israeli moves towards a settlement.

Siddique: Is it time for other nations, such as Arab and European, to join those efforts — so as to not give the United States a monopoly? Would they have an impact if they were part of the talks?

Shlaim: The European Union should be a player in bringing about a settlement, because the EU has real leverage with both parties. The EU is the main source of foreign aid for the Palestinian Authority, and Israel does 35% of its trade with the European Union. Last year alone, the total amount of trade between Israel and the EU was £31 billion [$42.7 billion].

The EU undoubtedly has this leverage with Israel, but it has never exercised it because it is not a unitary actor. It has 27 member countries, some of them are very pro-Israeli like Germany, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. These countries would most probably veto any resolution to impose sanctions on Israel. The EU has been ineffectual both because of its internal structure and because America has sidelined it. For the foreseeable future, it is likely to remain a payer, not a player.

The Arab world should be an important actor in all this because it has a direct stake in what happens in Palestine. Arab states also have a religious stake because Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam. But the Arab states have been pretty passive and totally ineffective when it came to the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

In fairness to the Arab states, it has to be pointed out that they have got a clear and unified position on the Palestine question. It was formulated in the Arab League summit in Beirut in March 2002, when a Saudi proposal was adopted unanimously and became the Arab Peace Initiative. The Arab Peace Initiative offered Israel formal peace and full normalization with all 22 member states of the Arab League, in return for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with a capital city in East Jerusalem. This was the real deal of the century, not Trump’s phony deal. It gave Israel everything it had previously asked for, but Israel had to pay with land for peace. Israel completely ignored the Arab Peace Initiative.

Yet the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue did not hold. There used to be a pretty general commitment to the Palestinian cause, but since the Oslo Accord when the Palestinians acted independently and signed a peace accord with Israel, the Arab states feel less bound to support the Palestinians. Particularly in the last four years, during the presidency of Donald Trump, the Arabs came under pressure to abandon the Palestinians. Trump’s idea was to have a united front of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Iran. The price that the Gulf Arabs were expected to pay America in return for support against Iran was to ditch the Palestinians. This is what the countries that signed the Abraham Accords have done. They did bilateral deals with Israel, which was a stab in the back to the Palestinians.

Siddique: Have the Abraham Accords killed the Arab Peace Initiative indefinitely — even a tweaked version of it?

Shlaim: No, definitely not. The Abraham Accords have not killed and not modified in any way the Arab Peace Initiative. It remains on the table and the big prize is Saudi Arabia. Israel and President Trump hoped that Saudi Arabia would sign a peace accord with Israel, and that would have effectively been the end of the Arab Peace Initiative. Saudi Arabia, however, did not pronounce on the peace deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. It did not support it publicly nor did it follow suit. The Saudi foreign minister stated that Saudi Arabia remains committed to the Arab Peace Initiative and support for the Palestinians. And the Arab Peace Initiative is still the official position of the Arab League.

Siddique: You didn’t have much faith in Donald Trump’s ability to mediate a peace agreement. The Biden administration has faced criticism over its response to the latest conflict. Progressive politicians in the United States, such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib, have spoken out. Do you see hope that Joe Biden’s team would get the Palestinians and Israelis to talk, which they haven’t in many years?

Shlaim: I don’t have much hope in Biden breaking away from the traditional mold of American foreign policy, which is pro-Israeli. The default position of American administrations is to appease Israel. Biden has had a very long career in American politics, and he is one the strongest and most consistent supporters of Israel. He once stated that if Israel didn’t exist, America would help to invent it. He also said, on another occasion, that if he were a Jew, he would be a Zionist. He then corrected himself and said, “You don’t have to be a Jew to be a Zionist. I am a Zionist.” It is even worse than that because he is, by his own account, an unconditional Zionist.

Biden was vice-president for eight years under Barack Obama, which gave Israel a huge amount of aid. Particularly at the end of the administration, they signed a military aid deal worth $38 billion over 10 years. This annual grant of $3.8 billion in military aid is unconditional. Biden was one of the people who always refused to tie American aid to Israel to Israel’s respect for Palestinian human rights and international norms. That is still his position: his support for Israel is unconditional.

One recent manifestation of this was International Criminal Court’s decision to investigate war crimes in the Occupied Territories. Trump had imposed sanctions on the ICC judges because they threatened to investigate Israel. Biden has lifted the sanctions, but he’s still strongly opposed to any investigation of Israel by the ICC. The most disturbing manifestation of Biden’s bias in favor of Israel happened during the May crisis. Two things happened.

First, the Security Council, on three occasions, tried to issue a statement calling for an immediate ceasefire. Biden vetoed all three attempts. All three attempts were supported by the 14 other members of the Security Council. America alone stopped a declaration, a statement in favor of an immediate ceasefire. That tells you a lot. It tells you that Biden looked to Netanyahu, and Netanyahu wanted more time to do even more damage in Gaza. Biden gave him that extra time to do his worst.

Secondly, Biden authorized — without consulting Congress — when the fighting was going on, arms sales to Israel worth nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars, mostly precision munitions to fire on Gaza. In this instance, Biden paralyzed UN diplomacy and empowered Israeli militarism against the Palestinians.

Israel’s latest assault on the people of Gaza, like all its previous wars, inflicted death and devastation on Gaza but left the underlying problems completely unsolved. The use of military force does nothing to resolve what is essentially a political problem. If America takes the lead in resuming peace talks, which is not at all certain, Biden is unlikely to come up with any new ideas.

Biden is no longer representative even of his own party. Progressive members of the Democratic Party are critical of him and his conduct. The congresswomen that you mentioned and Bernie Sanders are now calling for an American arms embargo on Israel. This is unprecedented.

There is another factor at play in America: young, progressive Jews are increasingly disenchanted, even disgusted with Israel. Peter Beinart, who is the leading expert on this, estimates that AIPAC represents maybe 30% of American Jews and J Street roughly 70%. A growing number of young, American Jews are openly critical of Israel, critical of its human rights abuses, critical of the occupation, and they support a two-state solution. So, not only the American public has been turning against Israel, but Jewish opinion in America is also turning against Israel. Eventually, if not immediately, Biden would have to adjust to the new reality at home.

We have to remember that in America, Israel is not a foreign policy issue, it’s a domestic politics issue. The fact that there is such strong support for Israel throughout America, especially among Christian Evangelists, explains why America has been so biased in favor of Israel. But if the landscape in America continues to shift against Israel and in support of the Palestinians, official American foreign policy may eventually follow.

Siddique: That’s an interesting point you mention about Israel being a domestic issue, not a foreign policy issue. One final question for you, professor. For our readers who are interested in learning more about the conflict, which books and/or authors would you recommend?

Shlaim: I warmly recommend Ian Black’s “Enemies and Neighbours: Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1917-2017” and Rashid Khalidi’s “The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017.” At the risk of sounding immodest, I would mention my own book, “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World,” a critique of Israeli policy towards the Arab world since 1948. But I should warn your readers that it is 900 pages long! In 1995, I published a Penguin book, a short paperback called, “War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History.” This is an easy introduction to the international politics of the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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The best book I know on America and the Arab-Israeli conflict is by William B. Quandt and it is called, “Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967.” On the Arab world in general, I warmly recommend a book by Fawaz A. Gerges: “Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East.” This book was published by Princeton University Press in 2018, and it deals with the two main trends in Arab politics: Arab nationalism represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser and political Islam represented by Sayyid Qutb.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region that is more often in the news for bombs and bullets than booming businesses, is experiencing a startup revolution. Nearly six years since the start of the Arab Uprisings, entrepreneurship is on the minds of those as young as 15. With unemployment and underemployment still being key factors in a region that sits on a powder keg, MENA youth are hungry to shape their own future. Alongside them, however, there is an even hungrier demographic that is having their aha moments: women.

Women entrepreneurs provide the MENA region with an economic opportunity. To understand the issue, it is important to look at the underlying problems.

THE YOUTH BULGE

As this author and Casper Wuite explained in The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, the key catalysts behind the revolts of 2010-11 included poor economic growth, inequality, unemployment and underemployment, and poverty. When food prices go up but getting a well-paid job is like finding a needle in a haystack, frustration is bound to grow. As summed up in the book: “Stagnant economies tend to lack jobs. Most parts of the Arab world suffer from high unemployment … With no prospects for the future, it is not surprising that populations are fractious and prone to revolt.”

Despite the book being published in 2012, not much has changed. War has spread from Libya and Syria to Iraq and Yemen; disenfranchised youth across MENA have joined extremist groups while others have set sail on the migrant trail to Europe due to brain drain or conflict; and unemployment and underemployment are still rife.

Beyond the news headlines, unemployment and underemployment are the biggest issues facing the MENA region. With an immense youth bulge—half of MENA youth are under 25, which makes the region the second youngest after sub-Saharan Africa—the unemployment of young people can be a boon or bane. Discontent over government economic policy can lead to trouble. But, likewise, motivated and empowered youth can help build middle-income countries like Morocco and Jordan and high-income countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia as they develop and diversify their economies.

INCLUSION OF WOMEN

Aside from the economic issues facing young people, however, women in MENA face an even tougher challenge. As Lama Ataya of Bayt.com notes, while the “majority of working-age women in the MENA region are educated, the majority of them remain outside the labor force.” In fact, women in the MENA region “are underrepresented in the workforce with only 25% of eligible females employed,” as Maria Khwaja notes at Fair Observer. Egypt in particular has a far higher rate of unemployed young women than men.

In no other region is the full inclusion of women needed more than the Middle East and North Africa. With the massive potential of educated women in helping to bring economic prosperity to the region, this is an area that needs closer attention.

After all, women can be change-makers for the political, economic and social development of any country. As Lakshmi Puri, deputy executive director of United Nations Women, states: “[W]omen … are game-changers in building more resilient, peaceful, inclusive and prosperous countries.” In order to the meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are global targets set by the United Nations for 2030, it is vital that women in MENA are included at every step of the way. When more women work—along with men—economies tend to grow.

Eric Asmar, director of programs at the Moroccan Center for Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship (Moroccan CISE), reaffirms this in an interview at the organization’s co-working hub in Rabat: “Across the board, the positive effects of women in the labor force are well-documented.”

WOMEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN MENA

But while the inclusion and unemployment of women is still an issue, this does not mean that women in MENA are not active players. While unemployment is holding back the economic development of the region, women (and youth) are shaping their own future by entering the start-up industry.

From Morocco and Egypt to Jordan and Qatar, entrepreneurship is seen as the new “fashion” in the region. This can be a good thing and a bad thing. If more start-ups are created, so will more jobs—and with that a more productive impact on the economy. As an added bonus, less pressure is on governments for annual job creation as they struggle to keep up the growing demands of the employment market.

At the same time, however, not all start-ups are successful. As this author was told in Amman while conducting field research for his forthcoming book, The Youth of the Middle East, countries like Jordan and Lebanon have thousands of new companies being created, but not all are active. Instead of founders creating a successful business, the firms are simply registered in the country but with no work being done.

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In fact, a foreign investor in Paris told this author that “most start-ups in the Middle East and North Africa that are building mobile apps are likely to fail—that’s the reality of it.” The business models are either poorly constructed or there is a metaphorical glass ceiling on how far the product can be taken. The risk here is in brain drain if an entrepreneur fails to make a buck with their business.

But while there is no guarantee that creating a company will lead to success, entrepreneurship is a field that carries much promise for the future of MENA. Despite female entrepreneurship being less common in the MENA region compared to other parts of the developing world, Yasmine El Baggari—a budding Moroccan entrepreneur and founder of Voyaj, a US-based travel startup that is winning fans at the White House—talks about the positive buzz surrounding female entrepreneurship in MENA: “After a discussion with Christopher M. Schroeder, it was clear that female entrepreneurship is thriving across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in the technology sector. In his new book, Startup Rising: The Entrepreneurial Revolution Remaking the Middle East, Schroeder reports that over a third of startups in the region are run by women—a higher percentage than in Silicon Valley.”

Beating male-dominated Silicon Valley might not be that difficult, but the fact that the MENA region is the one that has more start-ups than the Bay Area is telling of the “revolution” that is brewing in the Middle East and North Africa.

The impact that women can have on the region’s economic situation provides light at the end of the tunnel. But their passion, drive and ability to start successful businesses are unmatched for Asmar. He says that “women are uniquely equipped to be entrepreneurs with the way they manage teams, time, finances.”

Having managed many startups as part of Moroccan CISE’s incubator program, Dare Inc., and collaborated with countless others across the region, Asmar goes on to add: “On the MENA level, we have specific challenges that women are well-equipped to address … and with many socioeconomic issues across the board, women are better equipped to bridge those gaps.”

Female entrepreneurs throughout the MENA region are as diverse as their male counterparts. From diligent designers to tech-savvy developers, women entrepreneurs “are moving across different sectors,” Asmar says. “In the previous generation, there was a division: like in women-focused fields such as food, cosmetics, textiles, artisans, handicrafts—the traditional sectors. But in the younger generation, you have women … working in agriculture, in tech.” Other fields include “consulting, communications and coaching,” as Nezha Dermoumi, the chief financial officer of Moroccan CISE, adds. The female start-up industry is clearly changing.

SOCIAL CHALLENGES FOR WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS

While female entrepreneurship does carry promise, there are significant challenges that inevitably go along with it. While global institutions like the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation have substantially highlighted key challenges faced by female entrepreneurs—additional training, human resources, access to finance and high costs—there are other basic issues at the social level that are often overlooked in policy reports.

Many entrepreneurs across the region have told this author that parents often do not want them to take a leap of faith and enter the start-up industry. Parents want their children to have a stable job in traditional fields—law, medicine, education—get married and have a family of their own.

Dermoumi explains this further: “In our culture we have family barriers. For our parents, success is to have a job in government or at big companies with social benefits, pensions, etc.”

Despite not being a gender-specific challenge—or even region-specific—female entrepreneurs often face added family pressure for them to get married before starting a company. Then, after marriage, there is an issue of further challenges of balancing family life with finding the time to write up business plans, as one entrepreneur in the United Arab Emirates told this author.

Yasmine El-Mehairy, co-founder of Supermama, sums it up: “Of course there is the social look of, ‘Ah she’s an entrepreneur, of course that explains why she’s not married at 30, that’s it.’”

While Dermoumi says that women entrepreneurs in general “face similar difficulties” as their male counterparts, these are added challenges. In smaller towns and cities in MENA, women face problems when some men simply do “not want to deal with them,” Dermoumi adds. This may occur when women are creating and marketing their products or services, and it may also be an issue when seeking external capital. While access to investment is a key challenge for both male and female entrepreneurs, as a 2014 Wamda report highlights, for women in smaller cities it can be even more difficult due to patriarchal conditions.

“People don’t take women seriously,” says Dermoumi. “In Casablanca and Rabat, we don’t see this that much, but in other regions that’s not the case.” In fact, this author was told by a Bahraini entrepreneur that sometimes men will not take a woman seriously unless she is wearing an abaya (long gown).

But while such challenges are context-specific and should not be generalized, as Asmar mentions, some women in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have used these challenges to their advantage. “In Saudi Arabia,” he says, “there is a whole group of women [tech] developers who have started their own conferences—in a context where they are not even allowed to interact with men at conferences, so they create a women-only conference and use the segregation to their advantage with bringing in sponsors themselves.”

Asmar goes on to note: “There are social norms. [But remember] there are diverse contexts across the region. I have spoken to a lot of women in the region about their barriers, and many have told me, ‘what’s in my head’ and that they have the pieces necessary. Other women have other issues.”

Risk is the keyword for both male and female entrepreneurs—from San Francisco to Hong Kong. “There is a risk aversion in a lot of countries in the region: the idea that the best job is in the government, followed by a big company, and entrepreneurship is way down the line,” Asmar adds. And this is “multiplied when it comes to women, because there are social pressures to marry and to adhere to social standards,” but within social contexts of different countries.

THE NEXT STEP

So, what is needed?

Dermoumi says there needs to be increased “awareness” about the benefits of entrepreneurship when it comes to family pressure. She adds that women entrepreneurs must emphasize that they have the “ambitions to achieve [their] dreams.” The raising of awareness must, for Dermoumi (and other interviewees across MENA), involve the showcasing of “success stories.” To mention a few: Najla Al-Midfa, Manal Elattir and Yasmine El Baggari.

Constructive criticism is essential when it comes to entrepreneurship, and Asmar says that women “need the same support that any entrepreneur needs. Every entrepreneur needs a particular kind of support, but everyone needs mentoring and coaching that’s specific to their individual challenges. And I think that’s the case for women as well.”

Considering that female entrepreneurship is still lower in MENA that other parts of the developing world, more needs to be done to assist women in not only starting a business, but in starting a successful one.

Asmar is unequivocal here: “The policy changes should be focused on education to encourage entrepreneurship and larger policy questions relating to promoting entrepreneurship. So, making it easier to become an entrepreneur—facilitating the ability to start businesses, to trade, to buy shares, to invest [all have] benefits.”

Indeed, as previously mentioned, in order for the Middle East and North Africa to achieve the SDGs by 2030, women must be included and empowered in all aspects of life: political, economic and social. Asmar puts it astutely when he says: “When women participate, you see greater growth. Improving women’s education and participation in entrepreneurship and the workforce has positive effects on all of society, not just women.”

Amelia Stewart, writing for the Adam Smith Institute, says promoting entrepreneurship is essential: “Not only do more start-ups equate to more jobs for everyone, [but] firms run and owned by women are more likely to employ other educated women [than] firms run by men.” With that, the unemployment rate of women would decrease and the regional rate of gross domestic product (GDP) would increase.

Organizations like Moroccan CISE, Oasis 500 and INJAZ aim to prepare youth and women of the Middle East and North Africa to shape their future and their country’s future. Greater support for such initiatives will aid the MENA region as it seeks to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

The first step is providing the necessary support to women in both large and small cities. After all, small cities lay the foundations for a better society at large.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Petar Chernaev

The post Beyond Business Plans: Women Entrepreneurs in MENA appeared first on Fair Observer.

“What can the power of travel do?” asks Yasmine El Baggari, a young Moroccan entrepreneur, at an event in Rabat hosted by US-based startup Voyaj and the World Bank.

As someone who is always hopping across continents, travel is part of my vocabulary. I easily get bored when sat in one city or country for too long. But even I am stumped with that question. I mean, what can the power of travel do? Does travel mean more than going on vacation and taking a few snaps of Big Ben or the Burj Khalifa?

While trying my best to get over writer’s block—ironically I am working on my second book—I have set out to understand what travel means.

You see, travel can scare the bejeebers out of you. Think about it: You’re in a strange place where you probably don’t know the language and you see no familiar faces. After all, it’s not like Cheers where “everybody knows your name.” So, who wouldn’t get scared? Well, at least to begin with.

In fact, I remember a friend once sent me a text message that said, “I have no idea how you always travel and live abroad. I was in Morocco for four days, and on the second day I was crying. I much prefer sitting at home in London with a cup of tea.”

As I said to her, explore your local surroundings on the first day, venture out on the second day, and once you are past the third day, you’ll be fine. In fact, add speaking to strangers whenever you get a chance and you’ll feel like Usain Bolt after winning a race. To be honest, I have a habit of speaking to strangers, especially when abroad, and getting into odd situations.

But while travel can be daunting as you step outside of your comfort zone, it can also be something you will never forget. For me, I have so many memories—good and bad—that I have built and that I am still building. Memories that include listening to the stories of Palestinian refugees at Gaza Camp in Jordan, discussing politics on Avenue Habib Bourguiba in post-revolution Tunisia, or even being detained at airports in Lebanon and Morocco.

Voyaj: Connecting People

Travel is so much more than just sitting on a beach, visiting a few touristy hotspots and never learning about a different culture. And it’s this exact reason that Yasmine El Baggari launched Voyaj: to connect people, both locals and travelers. Think Facebook, Airbnb and Couchsurfing, but without the exchange of money.

I remember saying to Yasmine in 2014 that Voyaj promises to take the world by storm. I still stand by that.

At 22-years-old, she is one of the most driven and motivated people I have had the pleasure of meeting. She is building a company that “connects like-minded hosts and travelers to share authentic cultural experiences, bridging cultures, and opening hearts and minds.”

I love that word, “authentic.” And even “opening hearts and minds.” Because that’s what real travel does: It opens your heart to find new loved ones or loved places abroad, and it opens your mind to cultures and traditions beyond your own.

Having left Morocco to study in the US at the age of 17, Yasmine explains what travel means to her.

“Travel has the ability to transform people’s lives,” she says in her often passionate tone, “through one-on-one personal interactions, and expand people’s horizons and perspectives about different places and cultures and break down stereotypes.”

With a crowdfunding campaign in the works, Voyaj will certainly have some fun rewards lined up. The buzz around the US-based startup has seen it partner with a host of personalities and companies, including the rapper Akon, Forbes and Turkish Airlines.

Currently in beta testing, the tech-savvy team at Voyaj is perfecting the backend infrastructure ahead of a global launch. But that doesn’t mean travelers have yet to use the website.

While on a “Voyaj experience” in Morocco, Bear Kittay, a social alchemist at the Burning Man Project, breaks it down for me.

“Travel is a portal for an individual or for a society into seeing the world in a different way,” he says as his eyes close while he searches for the inner words to describe his experience.

“In our age, there is an illusion that we change and transform things through technology alone or through concepts. That’s a fallacy,” he adds. “The reality is that change for an individual and a society happens through experience. And experience is most effective when it’s a journey into the unknown.”

On his first trip to Morocco, but certainly not his first time outside America, the words jump out as Bear sums up what travel can do. “Travel facilitates a type of education, a type of recalibration of an individual,” he says.

Indeed, travel can give a person a lifetime of education beyond simply reading a textbook. In fact, Lucas Ausems set out to explore the countries he studied at university by actually traveling to those nations. He’s already been to Bangladesh, Myanmar and Indonesia and has written about his experience for Fair Observer.

For myself, travel has given me friends in more countries than I would have ever imagined. It has given me homes in places I would never had thought of visiting. And it has made me grow into the person I am today.

So, what can the power of travel do? Wow, I’m stumped again! Has writer’s block kicked back in?

Well, I guess I’m still finding out what travel truly means to me. But when I do, Yasmine, you’ll be the first to know.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Yasmine El Baggari

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The post What Can the Power of Travel Do? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Experiencing a Moroccan city on foot is probably the best thing to do when you’re really looking to explore. If you want to take in the sights and sounds, get out of the taxi and start walking — a word of advice, though, bring some boots.

In Casablanca, by taking a stroll along the coast by the Hassan II Mosque, you will probably encounter young couples holding hands and enjoying each other’s company. Or you might see men who sit alone and gaze at the breathtaking Atlantic Ocean as the waves strike the shore — perhaps imagining what life is like on the other side.

By wandering down the busy boulevards of the city center, you will come across men and women of different ages, mingling over a cup of Moroccan mint tea and having a bite to eat, or perhaps even expats in a fancy French brasserie.

Or you might stroll through what is probably Casablanca’s equivalent to the “Orange County,” before heading to Morocco Mall, the largest shopping center in Africa. After which, you might pass by Ain Diab beach to see a young, female surfer as she wipes down her board — yes, not all Arab and Muslim women wear hijabs (headscarves).

Then, when you’re done with all this — and when your legs are probably aching — you might hop along to the medina, or old city, and wander around the many rues (street), having passed the beautiful palm trees that grace the busy roads.

In these streets, by the souq (market), there’s plenty of graffiti that add color to the old white walls of this part of town. Having spotted the street art, and other similar pieces around town, I decided to take some snaps — well, that was until a man started to preach to me about not taking photos for religious reasons (or that’s what I took away from him speaking Moroccan Arabic).

As I said in an earlier article, the Middle East — well, and North Africa — is about far more than just bombs and bullets.

*[A version of this article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Abul-Hasanat Siddique

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Tired of reality TV shows focusing on Kim Kardashian or some other pointless celebrity? Ever think reality TV could be a little deeper? Thankfully, you’re not alone. A groundbreaking, new “edutainment,” reality TV show that launched in late 2013 in Egypt has skillfully harnessed the power of mainstream media to ask some bigger questions of its audience, such as: How do you tackle social and environmental problems and make money at the same time?

Combining some of the best aspects of The X Factor, The Apprentice and Ashoka’s Changemakers, El Mashrou3 (The Project, in Arabic) is the first-ever reality TV show about business and social entrepreneurs in the Middle East.

Produced by Bamyan Media, a social enterprise that specializes in creating impact-oriented television shows for social change in the developing world, El Mashrou3 is an innovative and original formatted reality TV show that brings together 14 young contestants from different walks of life as they live together and work to find solutions to social and environmental problems that can also be sustainable, profitable businesses. With the concept of the show drawn up in the wake of the January 25 Revolution, El Mashrou3 seeks to highlight the renewed passion for social change among Egyptian youth.

Sponsored by heavyweight tech partners Samsung and Google, the reality TV show racked up tens of millions of viewers in Egypt following a successful first season. It created a large action-led social media community — over 1 million — as part of its on-the-ground outreach effort to connect viewers with ways to practically start their own social enterprises and businesses. El Mashrou3 is now set for a second season in Egypt, as well as being adapted and localized for several other regions, including India, Jordan, Philippines and Bangladesh.

In this interview, author and journalist Abul-Hasanat Siddique speaks to Asim Haneef, Bamyan Media’s global director of development and the executive producer of El Mashrou3. Haneef is a former Al Jazeera English producer and journalist specializing in long-form, sociopolitical documentaries on activism, technology and sustainability. Currently based in Cairo, he is also a fellow of the Aspen Institute, the pan-Asian think tank Asia House, a TEDx speaker, part of the under-30s “young leaders” network Sandbox and on the advisory board of tech entrepreneurship quarterly Erly Stage.

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Thank you for taking the time to speak to us. First, please tell us a bit about your background and how you got to where you are today.

Asim Haneef: I was born in London and grew up in a town called Croydon.I don’t have many memories from my childhood, but I remember I was a pretty empathetic child and wanted to help others, especially those I saw being victimized and oppressed through no fault of their own — basically being born with a different set of results from me in this insane geographical lottery of life.

I remember witnessing a lot of that injustice around me, and I guess the way I channeled that into my work in the media was by recognizing at about 15 years old that this all-conquering entity — the “media” — had largely replaced the role of religion in dominating our imagination, culture and consciousness, and that I could probably trace back about 70% of whatever people were talking to me about on any given day to some form of media output, whether that be a newspaper, TV report, radio or other.

I began to think there must be ways to harness this medium to educate, inspire and inform others, through storytelling and truth-telling with a flashlight of some kind. I wasn’t yet sure if that was through news, books, investigative documentaries, reports or other mediums, but I felt it was a fairly good field for me to try my hand at and one that naturally fit with my hunger and curiosity about other people and the planet we exist on.

© Bamyan Media

So I started off writing hundreds of letters to TV production companies, asking if I could have a five-minute coffee with them. I wrote about 500 letters and received around 495 negative replies, which I used as motivational wallpaper for my room. But I got a couple of encouraging messages that said, why don’t you just come in for a quick coffee? So I pounced at the chance and soon started working as a tea boy/runner at a production company, then an intern at Bloomberg, then a researcher on some BBC projects. I then really just jumped across lots of different TV production and news companies and did whatever I could to get closer to a role that I felt enabled me to use media in a more meaningful way to build a better world.

Siddique: And then you moved to Al Jazeera English, right?

Haneef: Yes, I became a researcher and producer at Al Jazeera English with a focus on global sociopolitical documentaries. Whilst there I pitched and helped develop a series called Activate, which was about young, change-making social activists across the world. That idea came about in 2011, just as the Arab Uprisings (sometimes oddly referred to as the Arab Spring) started to emerge, and I wondered: Why can’t we find a way to tell stories about social activists around the world who are doing something brave and inspiring — but in a positive light — and also tell their stories as flawed human beings with the exact same vulnerabilities as you and I, not making them out to be superheroes, but just incredibly driven and courageous people? So, I identified and developed stories in Pakistan, Sudan, India and China, and we made six, 30-minute documentaries that were successfully aired on Al Jazeera English, going out to millions of people globally.

Even though the series was a success and got re-commissioned for a second season, I was frustrated and remember clearly thinking: I wish these stories and the crucial themes of socioeconomic injustice, bravery and technological innovation could reach broader audiences. I wondered: Am I simply making news and documentaries that just reach niche, already-educated viewers — people who know the issues? Do these films only get seen by a handful of people that understand the issues already? Am I just preaching to the choir? Is this just a comfortable media job that enables me to keep making films without having to really think hard about the audience, whether they are having any impact or contributing to any real change on the ground?

I began to wonder how to explore some of these complex themes with broader audiences — such as, how do you reach the young and old mainstream audiences that don’t give a s**t about politics and the news? Those who find the whole universe too serious and inaccessible. That seemed like an interesting challenge.

After doing some basic research, I found that the majority of those people were either glued to long-running soaps/dramas/serials or some form of reality TV. So I began to consider how to use the popular medium of reality TV shows to communicate basic business information or to inspire, educate and empower, perhaps focusing on some of the individuals in our world who I felt really needed to be highlighted — not just social activists, but the upcoming new generation of creative social entrepreneurs, people using business to affect large-scale social change. I really loved this concept of the social entrepreneur and realized that most people still had no idea what it was, making it a great subject to communicate to a mass audience.

Siddique: Why was that? Why do many people not know about social entrepreneurship?

Haneef: Well, people might not be familiar with the term “social entrepreneurship,” which is still pretty new across the globe, but many are familiar with the concept of an ethical business created to make a financial return and be good for the community. This is what regular business used to be before the era of unregulated corporate casino capitalism, under which profit was king regardless of social consequences. Social entrepreneurship is at least a label for the revival of this old concept that business can be a force for good and part of the solution to the social transformation required so desperately in society, if we are to have a fairer and more just world for all of us. 

Historically, businesses were drivers for social, environmental and economic change — they cared about the communities they served. I believe companies like Cadbury’s was actually started to wean people off alcohol and its negative effects — its remit was one of responsibility to people, not just to shareholders. It’s only in the last 20-30 years that we’ve reached this point where profits are prioritized over anything else. And yet we all know that’s not sustainable, so there needs to be more responsible businesses and entrepreneurs emerging, especially in the next generation of younger people — and they need to be encouraged and highlighted.

A popular reality TV show in a developing country highlighting some of these themes and people seemed like a good idea that could not only inspire and encourage millions of young people, but also become a platform for connecting those that wanted to start their own businesses with the resources, tools, mentors and networks they needed to take that first all-important step.

I wrote up a proposal for the show, pitched it around and found some success from funders. However, at the same time, I was also put in touch with someone called Anna Elliot, who had done something similar in Afghanistan but on a microscopic scale. I was supposed to have a ten-minute Skype call with Anna that turned into a four-hour conversation about the power of “edutainment.” We talked about Sesame Street, the psychology of brands and marketing, how to reach a mass audience and why edutainment had mostly failed across the world. We agreed to work together on the show in Egypt, a country suffering from some of the highest youth unemployment and gender inequality rates in the Middle East and North Africa, and also in the grip of monumental economic and political change.

Siddique: So we’re talking about the uprising in 2011?

Haneef: Yes, the youth were leading the charge for change politically on the streets, but we also wanted to develop this TV show to focus on the wider economic question — because even back then, some observers were rightly pointing out that you needed an economic revolution alongside a political one for real long-lasting and systematic change on an institutional level.

We held a three-day co-creation action lab bringing together the key stakeholders within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the educational system, youth, business leaders, activists and NGO [nongovernmental organizations] to ask: How do we collaboratively create an educational TV show that’s going to have an inspiring, positive impact on the country and, hopefully, lead to a nationwide movement triggering more young people to believe in themselves and their own ability to create and own a business project, and go from the ideas stage to execution with the help and assistance of the growing start-up ecosystem around them?

© Bamyan Media

Sorry to backtrack, but just to answer your initial question about how I got into all of this: I’m trying to create a different kind of approach using media, because I worked in news and documentaries for a long time and became tired of them — tired of the same press release “copy and paste” editorial line over whether a story gets traction or not. Usually, you have a bunch of white, middle-class editors who decide what’s going to be a global news story and that then somehow goes out to millions of people. I advise everyone who is interested in working in the media to study the economics of news production, because once you trace it back far enough, you realize that so many editorial decisions are purely related to who has the money, and even news companies owned by businessmen have biased agendas they are constantly pushing on the rest of us.

I decided that rather than continue in news and documentaries, I was going to try appeal to mass audiences, especially in the developing world, who were already having their brains and minds manipulated by TV — only with the lowest common denominator trash of mainstream entertainment and celebrity. For me, the challenge is: Can you really make something that’s educational and entertaining at the same time? And that’s what led me to where I am today.

Siddique: Moving on: Was Bamyan Media created with the TV show, El Mashrou3?

Haneef: The company itself? No, it was registered a few years ago in Afghanistan for the Dream and Achieve show; though only in Egypt have we become more aware of what Bamyan Media really is. It’s an attempt at a radical kind of media organization that’s a significant departure from traditional media, because we don’t just create or aggregate content. We have a process of quantifying the impact the media has — working with universities, ratings agencies and specialist M&E [monitor and evaluation] experts and other bodies to measure the effect it has in terms of providing behavioral and real-world social changes.

We go beyond the TV show with our on-the-ground outreach work. Most shows are made to go on TV, people watch them and then end of story. But with Bamyan Media, we create huge, sprawling social media communities around our shows; we stay engaged with millions of people who are watching them; and we help them connect to vital tools and resources on-the-ground, so they can set up their own business projects. For example, if someone watching the TV show about entrepreneurship in Egypt has an idea about an agriculture start-up that they want to do but don’t know how or where to start, Bamyan Media helps them to connect to an accelerator or incubator, and the potential funding organizations that will enable them to fulfill and realize the potential of their idea. It’s a very different thing to conventional media. It’s us saying: We’re not just a media organization; we are on the intersection of media and social development — and the TV shows are just one part of the equation.

© Bamyan Media

Siddique: Let’s talk about El Mashrou3: What is it about, and how has it helped the contestants and Egyptian society?

Haneef: The show, El Mashrou3, consists of 13 one-hour episodes. It’s a competition-based reality TV show and you have 14 contestants from across Egypt, each with an idea for a sustainable business. We chose them, brought them together and filmed them over about two months. We set challenges in each episode that related to an entrepreneurial lesson — so it became almost like a boot camp for entrepreneurs. One of the ways I describe the show more broadly is: If The X Factor or American Idol are about people achieving their dreams through their talent or voice, then El Mashrou3 is a reality TV show about young people reaching their dreams and fulfilling their potential through their business acumen, brains and a whole lot of hustle.

In every episode, you have two teams that are set a challenge often by one of the three main judges or a mentor — something related to a social problem Egypt faces. To give you an example, one of the biggest problems in the country is trash. So, the judges will say to the contestants: “One of Cairo’s biggest problems is trash. We would like you, in 48 hours, to use the trash and waste to develop a sustainable business model and then go out and sell what you’ve made on the streets.” In this particular episode, the two teams went to Cairo’s biggest trash yard and worked creatively to turn the country’s problem into a solution, by finding a way to create products, have a supply chain and sell the goods to market.

At the end of each episode, the winning team moves on to the next stage and one person within the losing team has to leave the show. There are elements of some other shows like The Apprentice, Dragon’s Den and Shark Tank. But The Apprentice is just a job interview from hell — that’s the tagline and it has nothing to do with social entrepreneurship or social innovation, and certainly isn’t about tackling society’s problems!

Siddique: Well, it’s to do with money.

Haneef: Yes, exactly! So we have a totally different angle that’s much more centered around “encouragement” rather than “humiliation” or laughing at people. Our contestants are not waiting to get a job; they are aspiring entrepreneurs from across Egypt learning to be even better leaders. They come from different cities and different backgrounds. One of the most important things on a show like this is to have a really wide cross-section of people that represent the authentic face of a country. So, we spent a long time finding those people through a casting roadshow across Egypt that lasted several months.

In the last three episodes of the show, the format shifts to become much more focused on the final three contestants’ personal projects and businesses, and how to make these social enterprises successful. Everything becomes much more focused on them — their business plan and how they will raise capital and get their project off the ground. This is our way of taking our main audiences through an entertaining and fun ride into finally the heart of start-up world, where you need to have a business plan, know your numbers and be prepared for anything necessary to build your business.

Siddique: And has the show finished?

Haneef: Yes, the first season of El Mashrou3 started in late 2013 and finished in April 2014. The ratings were between 3-4 million per episode, making it the fifth most successful show for the TV channel, Al Nahar — and Al Nahar is one of the biggest networks itself in Egypt. In total, we worked out that we had over 30 million views and over 270 million impressions on Facebook, and that it had beaten a lot of other popular reality TV shows like Dancing With the Stars  — becoming the first business, social entrepreneurship TV show to ever achieve that.

Siddique: It’s very innovative, and I like the link to American Idol, Dragon’s Den and The Apprentice, but from a social entrepreneurship approach. We don’t even see shows like that in Britain, so I think that’s absolutely brilliant. What does the winner get?

Haneef: Not sure why there’s no equivalent in the UK — maybe we should make one!Regarding the winner, besides the $350,000 grand cash prize toward building their business, they also get a combination of support from the entrepreneurial ecosystem accelerators, incubators and mentors. A lot of these entrepreneurs desperately want to have advisors to help them get their idea to a point where they are able to scale. We have also helped several of the other contestants go on trips abroad linked to securing funding, and every single contestant also received a range of gifts provided by our sponsors, including phones, laptops, TVs, website development assistance and six-months incubation.

© Bamyan Media

Siddique: And what happens to the other contestants, since one leaves after each episode?

Haneef: We decided that the whole tone of the show was going to be encouraging and positive. It wasn’t going to be negative or have insults like “you’re fired” or “get lost.” In a way, every contestant that leaves the show is a winner. In fact, our goodbye line from the judges is: “You will continue your dream, but not with us.” So it’s even framed in a way to make people feel encouraged and inspired that they joined in the first place. Every contestant who leaves the show goes off with a package of support from us that I mentioned earlier, making us perhaps the only TV show of its kind to do that.

Siddique: I personally can’t stand Alan Sugar, so I’m glad you don’t follow his line. But do you track their progress?

Haneef: Yes. We knew it wouldn’t be enough for us to just give contestants some money or support on a one-off basis and not follow-up. The contestants became celebrities in their communities and nationally, which we witnessed during the nationwide “entrepreneurship bus tour” we organized, with some of the contestants going around the country post-show with crowds of hundreds coming out in Alexandria, Aswan and Mansoura to hear them speak in a public setting about their experiences on the show and what they will do next. And we are following some of their progress to communicate via social media, so people can know what they are up to as well. This is hard, and it’s a struggle to keep up, but it’s something we are certainly keen to do and become better at in the months and years ahead.

Siddique: You traveled quite a bit last year. What’s the future for the show? Do you see it being sold to other parts of the developing world?

Haneef: Yes, we are currently in various talks and negotiations about bringing the show to several other territories. I recently read that 4 billion people still don’t have access to the Internet — and so, television is still one of the primary mediums to reach a wide array of people that aren’t online yet. Whether you like it or not, viewers are still sucking content up globally. It’s just that they’re absorbing content that doesn’t really do anything for them, their future and lives — to help them. The type of content they consume doesn’t give them a sense of being able to take the future into their own hands, and it doesn’t highlight and show examples of successful people that are at the same age as them.

In the West, we might be inspired and influenced by Martin Luther King Jr. But there’s a lot of young people in developing countries that don’t relate to him at all — they don’t see familiar role models around them that look like them, talk like them, understand their society or came up from the same neighborhood as them. I think we are subconsciously looking for a reference point in others or a role model. And one of the benefits of a TV show like El Mashou3 is it has the potential to reflect some of the best of society back to itself and say: “Hey, this is what someone born down the street from you is doing. It’s not going to be easy, but you have the potential to do the same.”

We are talking to the main television networks, telecoms companies, banks and ecosystem players in places such as Jordan, India, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Pakistan. The idea has been very  well-received in every country we visit. Everyone accepts that it’s a fantastic idea, using the power of media in a big way to inspire and educate.

And even though many people have had a similar idea for a reality TV show with a social edge, what separates us is that we’ve done it successfully now twice. We’re one of the first companies that actually went out there, managed to get the money and support from sponsors like Samsung, build the alliance and produce the show for a primetime mainstream audience.

So, to answer your question, yes we are actively exploring how to bring the project to a range of other places, but also making sure that in every country we go to, we listen very carefully with our partners on how to regionalize, localize and adapt the show. We don’t want to just copy and paste the show; every culture and country has a different identity and different challenges — that will invariably inform the content and programming itself.

For instance, in Bangladesh, the show may be more geared to resilience around climate change, because in time, the country faces the possibility of being submerged underwater. The biggest environmental and social concerns in Bangladesh are related to the scarcity of water and climate change, and also corruption and pollution. So these are going to be some of the top issues we will try to address and tackle on our show in the country. In Jordan, you have a tremendous amount of new jobs that need to be created within the next five years and huge issues around migrant populations from Iraq, Syria and Palestine. So how can our show encourage social entrepreneurs to start businesses in Jordan that are going to create jobs and contribute to inter-regional unity? These are some of the challenges for those regions.

Siddique: Are there specific countries you would like to state on record that you’re looking to pursue for a show?

Haneef: Yes: India, Jordan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. If you think you can help in any of those places, feel free to drop me an email on.

Siddique: Very interesting times ahead. Thank you!

Haneef: My pleasure.

*[A shorter version of this article is available at Your Middle East.]

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I am currently in Turkey, my first time in the country, and I am ashamed to say that I don’t understand any Turkish. I am staying by Taksim Square, a vibrant and busy part of Istanbul with many tourists around.

In 2013, the square was all over the news, with mass protests against the government. Today, it is once again filled with Turkish citizens and European and Arab tourists. Amid those taking snaps of the sights and mingling with friends and family, I see Syrian refugees walk around begging for money, food and water. Many of them are children between the ages of 4-10 and are homeless.

Having spoken to a few of them, most refugees in the area appear to be Kurdish, with some Arabs. As Maria Khwaja, an English teacher and a volunteer at a local charity that works with refugees, tells me: “A lot of the ones who make it this far are Kurdish — Syrian or Turkish Kurds — or they are Shiite because they are not wanted in refugee camps in the south.”

As I strolled through Gezi Park and Taksim Square last weekend, a shy, young girl walked alongside me and mumbled something, clearly asking for money. I asked, in Arabic, what her name was and she said Fatima but seemed reluctant to talk. She was about 4 years old. At the same time, another girl, who said she was Fatima’s sister, came to me as well; her name was Maryam and said she was 9 years old. Both of them were Syrian Kurds and could only speak a little Arabic — Maryam more so than Fatima.

Thinking back to them as I write this blog post, Maryam was about 6 years old when the Syrian Civil War started in March 2011, while Fatima was probably just a baby. Instead of being able to attend school in their homeland of Syria, these children are forced to run around the streets, day and night, and beg for money so they can eat and drink something.

“There are not enough schools,” Khwaja tells me. “There are a couple of Syrian schools, but they often cost money and are packed. The children can’t get into Turkish schools because they can’t afford to.” While I am told there are refugees who are better off than others in Turkey, this generation of Syrian children are at risk of being a lost one.

Not all Syrian refugees are homeless, Khwaja says. Some upper- or middle-class Syrians have been able to rent single rooms where up to 16 people often stay, while the lower-class are the ones who are likely to end up on the cold streets of Istanbul. As a BBC report highlights, rent prices have been hiked up so refugees are forced to pay up to 100 Turkish lira per day, which is the equivalent of $45.

“You’re talking of a country with over 22 million people and more than 9 million are displaced — internally and externally; that’s massive,” she says. “That’s nearly half the population of Syria. It’s like the world has forgotten about them. It’s a giant humanitarian issue. An entire generation of Syrian children who are just homeless.”

In Istanbul alone, there are more than 300,000 Syrian refugees. As Khwaja says, they are legally supposed to have registered with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and are then allocated to satellite cities around the country. However, for them to register now, they would have to travel from Istanbul to the UNHCR in Ankara but don’t have the money and means to get there.

Khwaja tells me: “When you talk to people, all they say is that they want to go back home. They just want to go back to Syria. We knew one family and they went back, and there was nothing. They said everything had been burned to the ground. So they came back to Turkey.”

The fact that you have a 4-year-old boy sitting alone on a wet floor at night in a busy Taksim Square is telling of how bad the Syrian refugee crisis is. This particular boy appeared shy and didn’t talk as I said hello to him while he counted change he had received from members of the public — he also had a tiny bit of bread that was on the floor. Perhaps he was Kurdish and didn’t understand Arabic, but this boy is probably traumatized and has lost his childhood. He has been forced to grow up far too fast and is likely to face a lifetime of hardship.

Who is More Needy?

Tonight, as I walked back to where I am staying, there appeared to be more and more women on the streets. They sit on the sidewalk with one hand held out to beg for spare change, while the other hand holds their young baby or child to keep them warm on such a cold evening. Their husbands have probably stayed behind in Syria to fight and are likely to be dead. To feed their children, I am told that many women have resorted to prostitution and are exploited by brothel owners in Istanbul.

I was recently asked how I could see these refugees and not want to do something to help them. Admittedly, one of the most difficult things I have ever experienced was to walk past a 2-year-old boy in no shoes. Many people, including Turks and tourists, give spare change or larger notes to the refugees. For the average person, it’s probably impossible to help every refugee who sits on the sidewalk each day.

As I walked back tonight, I had some spare cash in my pocket and bread left over from dinner. I thought, who should I give it to? I looked for Fatima and Maryam by Gezi Park, but couldn’t see them anywhere — I had told them to look out for me in my blue and white baseball jacket. In the end, I spotted an Arab Syrian lady who held her young daughter asleep in her arms as they both sat on the concrete floor against a shop window. She said “God bless you,” in Arabic, as I gave her some cash and told her I had bread in the bag.

As I walked away, I remembered a young mother with three children who I always see on the way home from Taksim Square. She sits under scaffolding with her three young children, one of them a baby no more than 6 months old.

Who was more needy? Probably both of them. With a tear in my eye, I walked past her and then saw around five other women sitting with young children as I strolled down the road. These women were not there the previous nights, but were in as much need as the lady I gave the bread and cash to.

I could probably conclude this post by stating that more is needed to help Syrian refugees in countries like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, but I will leave it with something Khwaja told me so you can reflect on the catastrophe that has afflicted Syrian people for nearly four years.

“You’re talking of a country with over 22 million people and more than 9 million are displaced — internally and externally; that’s massive,” she says. “That’s nearly half the population of Syria. It’s like the world has forgotten about them. It’s a giant humanitarian issue. An entire generation of Syrian children who are just homeless.”

*[This article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Are We Forgetting About These Syrians? appeared first on Fair Observer.

I live in an affluent, middle-class area of Casablanca with a number of fancy 4x4s and sports cars. People who live here clearly have money. If you walk 20 minutes in one direction, you will reach Casablanca’s “Knightsbridge,” and if you walk 20 minutes in the other direction, you will arrive at the city’s answer to the “Orange County.”

Yet going back to where I live in Casablanca, it is striking that despite the flash cars and purchasing power of the town’s many residents, around the corner from my apartment there are people living in what looks like a derelict construction site. They hang their clothes out to dry, sit around to eat and also sleep there — men, women and children.

Perhaps they are rural Moroccan migrants who can’t afford urban city accommodation prices and don’t have a job. But, as I stated in a recent article, the disparity in social classes in Morocco — as with many countries in the developing world — is striking.

On the one hand, the danger that poor, Moroccan migrants face when moving to a metropolis is that they won’t be able to afford the higher living costs — this is the same situation in the developing and developed worlds. On the other hand, moving to more urbanized surroundings has its perks in the quality of life indicators such as transport, health care and schools.

In fact, I recently met a young man from Fez on a train heading from Rabat to Casablanca. A man from the old city, he was looking to “reinvent” himself in the search for a new job and just needed to get away from the day-to-day life in Fez. We instantly connected and discussed a variety of random things from youth and entrepreneurship to The Matrix — a “Voyaj” or cultural exchange moment, as Yasmine El Baggari, a young, budding Moroccan entrepreneur, might call it.

In Morocco, rural migrants may be forced to endure poverty in small towns in the south, have inadequate access to basic services such as safe drinking water and live far away from suitable schools. In a globalized world where access to information is made easy with the Internet and satellite television, these migrants can see how people live in places such as Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier.

In fact, this is clearly the case with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, who travel to countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, and illegally jump on a boat to southern Europe, swayed by the attraction of a better way of life in a distant land — and many of them die on the way due to overcrowding.

In a nation of 33 million people, over 400,000 Moroccan children drop out of school every year. This is striking for a country that carries so much potential in its youth.

With high illiteracy rates in Morocco, rural migrants traveling to the big city are at risk of not finding a suitable job and ending up homeless. As early as 2011, Morocco’s official adult literacy rate stood at only 67%, one of the lowest in the Arab world. While this statistic in itself is alarming, El Baggari’s field research in Morocco suggests the figure may be even lower. As she states in Fair Observer: “In 1960, the estimated illiteracy rate among the Moroccan population was 87%. Today, that number has, encouragingly, decreased to approximately 56%.”

While the youth literacy rate shows signs of improvement — despite a large gap between males and females — many children in Morocco fail to finish school. Education is free and compulsory from the age of 6-15, and 95% of children are enrolled in school. However, according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID): “Drop-out rates are still high and only 53 percent of students enrolled in middle school continue on to high school and less than 15 percent of first grade students are likely to graduate from high school.” In a nation of 33 million people, over 400,000 Moroccan children drop out of school every year. This is striking for a country that carries so much potential in its youth.

As a Moroccan analyst recently told me, children in rural areas may have to travel as far as ten kilometers just to attend school. So when they are unable to go, they fall behind in their learning. Or if they are from a poor family, they are unlikely to finish school, since education is costly when it comes to learning material, travel and food. In the end, they may feel that school is a waste of time and drop out. Moreover, if their parents are unemployed, rural Moroccan youth may start working to make some cash and support their family — perhaps selling their wares down the street or shining shoes, as you often see around the country.

The young man I met on that train from Rabat to Casablanca received an education and I hope he finds a suitable job in the big city. But for other migrants who aim to hop on a train and travel to the busy urban boulevards, they must finish their education before thinking about moving to a metropolis. And, more importantly, they need better guidance from the government and civil society organizations, so they don’t end up living in a derelict construction site in Casablanca.

*[This article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Evp82 / Shutterstock.com

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As Muslims around the world mark Eid al-Adha, Morocco is building itself up for the big feast. This is my first time in a Muslim-majority country on Eid and the vibe is warm, hospitable and friendly. In Casablanca, Morocco’s largest city, there is anticipation as families and friends get together for the holiday that begins on October 5 in the country.

Eid al-Adha, a festival that commemorates Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son in obedience to God, is a time for prayer, fun and feasts. Just like Christmas, Hanukkah and Thanksgiving, it’s a time to be thankful and spend precious moments with loved ones.

On “Eid Eve,” Casablanca’s streets are busy — families out shopping, young couples spending time together and children running around. With mothers and fathers in a rush to buy presents and food, the medina and other neighborhoods around town are more packed than ever. Stall owners in the souq (market) shout out their best offers, in a bid to entice last minute shoppers. Morocco certainly has its fair share of last minute shoppers, just like the late ones on Christmas Eve.

Around Casablanca, whichever street you walk down, you’ll probably stumble upon “pop-up” sheep stalls. Yes, there are pop-up stalls that are selling sheep, calves and cows. Ironically, one of these stalls has turned a burger shop into a temporary outlet with about a dozen or so animals inside, as fathers turn up with their children to haggle a price — it’s actually amusing watching a child run away from a sheep.

Once bought, the animal is loaded onto a small truck and taken home, before being slaughtered for a feast — an act that is supposed to commemorate Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, Ishmael. Now, I am not a vegetarian — far from it, I love my kebabs too much — but I really wonder what goes through the poor sheep’s mind at that point. Nonetheless, Eid al-Adha in Morocco is certainly a moment full of joy, love and laughter.

Inequality in North Africa

In the backdrop of this, however, you cannot help but notice the poor: The people who sit at the side of the street in no shoes and tatty clothes; those who rummage through the trash in the hope of finding food; mothers who stand outside mosques begging for spare change, as they need to feed their children; or young men who shine shoes to earn a buck or two.

Due to a variety of reasons, including migration from rural towns to urban cities, there are sizeable populations in each of these countries that live in poverty. When poor people living in rural areas move to a metropolis like Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli or Cairo, they will continue to live in unbearable conditions but with different surroundings.

In Morocco, as with other countries in North Africa, inequality is striking. In Casablanca, you might walk along one street and see a flashy Maserati, only to walk down another to see a homeless man sleeping on the floor with derelict buildings around him — such drastic and differing conditions in the quality of life are shocking. While 1.7 million Moroccans moved out of poverty over the past decade, there still remains a visible divide between the haves and the have-nots. Without tackling wider socioeconomic issues in the correct manner, including illiteracy rates and an education system that needs a complete overhaul, there is a clear risk of poverty increasing instead of decreasing.

Morocco is not alone here. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, a disparity in wealth was a key factor behind the uprisings in 2010-11. According to CAPMAS, Egypt’s poverty rate stood at over 26% in 2012-13. Due to a variety of reasons, including migration from rural towns to urban cities, there are sizeable populations in each of these countries that live in poverty. When poor people living in rural areas move to a metropolis like Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli or Cairo, they will continue to live in unbearable conditions but with different surroundings. In fact, there are many Moroccan women who move from small villages to cities such as Casablanca, only to find out that they can’t put food on their children’s plate — some of these women even end up in prostitution as a result.

The Moroccan government must ensure that rural migrants are well-prepared before moving to urban cities. While Morocco isn’t the richest of the bunch, governmental and nongovernmental organizations are required to educate citizens in rural regions, so they are able to find suitable jobs in cities such as Rabat and Casablanca. Initiatives in empowering women, education and entrepreneurship will be key. If left untreated, underlying problems that lead to poverty will result in a continuation of inequality that could spiral out of control.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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In most Arab countries, photos of the dictator will appear just about everywhere. On billboards, street corners and in random shops — you name it. Yes, the vain dictator just loves seeing his face wherever he goes. Perhaps he should carry a mirror instead.

While Egypt has gone back to such a situation with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in Tunisia, those days are long gone, and so is Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The former president, who was known for his secular policies, ironically ran away to the most theocratic country in the world: Saudi Arabia. And no one has heard so much as a whisper out of him since.

Today, in Tunisia, you no longer see the dictator’s face down the street — the country has been on a political rollercoaster ride and is set for elections. But Tunisia, dubbed as the success story of the so-called “Arab Spring,” has changed in the everyday person’s mind. The fact that you can sit in a cafe on Avenue Habib Bourguiba — named after the country’s first president who ruled with an iron fist — and talk about politics is a big step forward. Many people are tired of politics, I am told, but the fact that Tunisians can have an open debate over where their country is headed is a remarkable departure from the Ben Ali era.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for other places in the Arab and Muslim world. In countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iran — you name it — the walls have ears, as the saying goes. In these nations, there is a fear of speaking about politics in public; a fear that spies for the regime are listening.

In Tunisia, however, it is indeed refreshing to see that people are no longer afraid of walls with ears. It is refreshing that Ben Ali’s face no longer ruins the country’s streets. But that’s where we have to hold the phone. While the dictator has gone, Tunisian officials have gone into a security frenzy following terrorist attacks and violence that have marred the country’s transition.

In the capital city, away from the tourist resorts in Hammamet and Sousse, barbed wire and barricades are common. These are not only found around government buildings, but they’re also along busy streets in the city center. You could be walking down a populated street with plenty of people sitting in cafes and suddenly come up against barbed wire that stands in your way — yes, it does throw you off at first. Or you could turn around and see security forces pull up with sniffer dogs.

This may be true, but Tunisia is in dire need of reform and investment — so much that Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa recently held an international conference to say the country is open for business. According to the same analyst, foreign investors from Europe want to enter the Tunisian market, but are concerned about security and stability.

Of course, it is understandable as to why authorities have employed such tactics. Tunisia has been caught in the middle of yet another conflict in neighboring Libya, as well as violence on the Algeria border. Those countries’ ills have trickled down on Tunisia and the outcome has seen terrorist attacks that were once unheard of in the country. When bombs explode and bullets fly, citizens will be scared — that much is clear. Added to that, En-Nahda, a moderate Islamist party that ruled the country in a coalition after Ben Ali’s ouster, was heavily criticized for being lenient on extremist Salafist groups that had set out to impose their order in Tunisia. These issues combined have resulted in security hysteria.

However, while Tunisian authorities lay barbed wire around the capital before elections to boost security, the quality of the country’s services have taken a toll. Simply put, Tunisia has a trash problem. Littered along many streets, you will see — and smell — rubbish that has simply been thrown away. As a Tunisian citizen tells me: “The government have gone mad about security, but why don’t they pick up the trash?”

While security concerns are understandable in a country that has undergone its highs and lows over the past three years, the next government must dig deep in its pockets and improve civil services. I am told by a Tunisian analyst that security is the first step to reform. Once a country is stable, other changes will follow, including those in the education system and civil services.

This may be true, but Tunisia is in dire need of reform and investment — so much that Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa recently held an international conference to say the country is open for business. According to the same analyst, foreign investors from Europe want to enter the Tunisian market, but are concerned about security and stability. That said, barbed wire and barricades do not signify a stable country; if anything, it shows a country on edge.

Therefore, to attract investment, Tunisia needs to do two things. First, it must secure its borders to avoid blowback from Algeria and Libya, and clamp down on homegrown extremists who pose a threat to security. A country where bombs explode will not see euros being pumped into it any time soon. Second, as I have argued in a previous article, Tunisia must improve its education system to suit the modern day. If Tunisia’s education meets the demands of 21^st century industries in technology, science and so on, foreign investors will set their eyes on the country.

With elections around the corner, the future is far from certain, but investors should keep a close eye on Tunisia.

*[This article was originally published at Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Nataliya Hora / Shutterstock.com

The post No Tunisia, Barbed Wire is Not Good for Business appeared first on Fair Observer.

As a researcher, what’s the first thing you do when you land in Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Uprisings? You talk about politics, of course. My Tunisian taxi driver tells me not much has changed since the fall of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. For him, the country has two main problems.

First, corruption holds any state back, in particular those in the Arab and Muslim world, as well as sub-Saharan Africa. Well, that’s pretty clear, but how? You see, hurdles on a racetrack mean people have to jump over them. But when you have bureaucratic hurdles — which corrupt officials are happy to make a buck out of — for basic things such as starting a business, people have to jump even higher. In the end, entrepreneurial activity takes a beating and modern industries continue to lack innovation.

Added to that, when land is siphoned off at a fraction of the price to the benefit of dodgy officials and businessmen, a state’s economy loses out and so do its people, since money is concentrated in the hands of a few. With so many residential developments in Tunisia that have multiplied since 2011, I wonder if they were sold at full market value.

Second, and this is the biggest part to chow down, education in Tunisia and the Arab world is outdated. Those who graduate do not have the skills that industries demand. So, what’s needed? An overhaul of the curriculum to suit the modern, globalized world so the youth and the economy benefit. The youth are the next generation and it is high time that aging autocrats realize that.

For the taxi driver, Tunisia’s education system has been problematic ever since post-independence, when it tried to follow the French model but instead fell flat on its face, incapable of innovating itself. In 2012, Tunisian officials stated that English would be encouraged more in school rather than French, the country’s second language after Arabic. Two years later, the education system is seeing gradual change as English is being pushed more, alongside Arabic and French — the best development for the taxi driver. This initiative actually began under Ben Ali with the British Council.

North Africans are some of the most multilingual people I have ever met: Arabic, French, English, Spanish, Italian and sometimes more. They have what many people in Britain and the US don’t have: the ability to speak in languages other than their mother tongue. 

Of course, other areas of the education system need reforming, but language carries huge potential in the years to come. Why? Well, without trying to sound like an imperial Brit, there are two main ways English can assist the youth in Tunisia.

First, North Africans are some of the most multilingual people I have ever met: Arabic, French, English, Spanish, Italian and sometimes more. They have what many people in Britain and the US don’t have: the ability to speak in languages other than their mother tongue. For industries around the world, North Africans who are this skilled in language — and in other fields — should be a recruiter’s dream. These individuals represent huge potential to work in many sectors, including science, trading and more. With a lack of suitable jobs in North Africa, it is little wonder as to why youth actively search for employment in the Gulf, Europe and North America. The more well-versed they are in English, the better chance the youth have at getting a job in these industries and regions.

Second, a country whose population is well-versed in English could see more investment from English-speaking nations, which would create jobs and boost the economy. It would also empower a disenfranchised youth population that sees no future career prospects. Brain drain is rife in North Africa and it is time for governments to seek solutions.

In fact, as a Moroccan minister stated, English is the language of most international industries. This includes science, banking, technology and trading. While French investment in Francophone countries has been the way forward since nation-states were born, France only represents a fraction of potential foreign direct investment (FDI). Even then, France is no longer the imperial power it once was. The state’s investments around the world have shrunk in recent years. Investment from industries that use English as a first language could view Tunisia as a frontier to tap. Considering that Tunisia’s FDI has plummeted since 2011, along with high unemployment, a stagnant economy and rising inflation, new avenues must be explored by the next government.

At the end of the day, the future of a country will be determined by decisions made in the present. Aside from security and stability concerns, Tunisians want change. From those I have spoken to, education is the first thing that slips off their tongue. Such reform will not occur overnight, as many of them rightly point out, but for the next generation of youth to see the fruits of the harvest, the correct change must be pursued today. Failure to do so will result in the continuation of brain drain.

*[This article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Jbor / Shutterstock.com

The post Reform in Tunisia: Overhauling the Education System appeared first on Fair Observer.

I recall hearing a professor who once said that “nothing interesting happens in the Middle East.” Ironically, his comment came in November 2010, a month before Arab youth rose up and demanded change, triggering an unprecedented wave of protests across the region.

The last few years have proven that the Middle East and North Africa are far from static: Syria has gone from bad to worse; religious zealots of the Islamic State have swarmed neighboring Iraq; Israel and Hamas have been at it again; Egypt has slid back into authoritarianism; Libya is on the brink of yet another war; and Yemen is marred by protests and violence. This list isn’t even an executive summary — just take a look at Al Jazeera’s homepage. Indeed, the layman reader could be forgiven for thinking the Middle East is nothing but the playground of war.

However, the region has more to it than just bombs and bullets. Did you know the Middle East has more startups run by women than Silicon Valley? Oh yes! The region that is always in the news for all the wrong reasons has produced more businesses run by women than the startup hub that hosts Google, Apple and Facebook. Did you know that Emirati girls outperform boys in school? Yes, beyond what right-wing, xenophobic commentators may tell you, many, many Arab women receive an education and pursue highly successful careers. And did you know that you can ski in Morocco? Yes, there’s more to North Africa than camel rides.

With an overemphasis on war and sectarian conflict in many historical books on the region, Manuel Langendorf and I have begun an ambitious project: to write a book (2016) that looks at the Middle East and North Africa through a different lens. Rather than looking at the security risks of violent conflict, we have begun exploring the future of the region from a social, economic and political perspective, with an emphasis on the youth.

Did you know the Middle East has more startups run by women than Silicon Valley? Oh yes! The region that is always in the news for all the wrong reasons has produced more businesses run by women than the startup hub that hosts Google, Apple and Facebook.

In fact, I was recently told that young, aspiring professionals are the most important market in the world. Why? Because they are the next journalists, analysts, historians, CEOs, professors, policymakers — you name it. Whichever way you look at it, these individuals are the next generation and the Middle East is no exception. The future is the youth and they should have a hand in shaping it.

While the Arab Uprisings have not been favorable to them, the youth still want change, despite being attacked, imprisoned and killed in places such as Egypt, Bahrain and Syria. As was the case in 2010-11, they want better prospects and freedom of expression, and they want it now.

So, in the region where “nothing interesting happens,” we want to find out what the youth think. From September 2014, Manuel and I will be traveling across the Middle East and North Africa to find out just that. The first stop is Tunisia and we welcome you to share your thoughts.

*[This article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Iraq is “approaching collapse — perhaps even a ‘failed state’ status.” Those are the words of former US Ambassador Gary Grappo.

Barely three years after the US withdrawal, large parts of Iraq have been overrun by insurgents. Spearheaded by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Sunni rebels, including Saddam-era army officers, have seized major towns in the country. In the process, ISIS has changed its name to the “Islamic State” and declared a caliphate that spans across parts of Iraq and Syria, with Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph.

The origins of ISIS lead back to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Islamist who ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and his Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). Upon entering Iraq after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi built ties with Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamist group whose band of Arab fighters he led. This organization is believed to be the “precursor” to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and not al-Qaeda itself. Later, in swearing allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his cohorts, Zarqawi’s JTJ soon became known as AQI — the Iraq branch of al-Qaeda.

Following Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006, in a US airstrike, Egyptian-born Abu Ayyub al-Masri changed the name of AQI to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) amid the Iraqi Civil War of 2006-07. After violence broke out in Syria in 2011, ISI fighters traveled to that country and merged with Syrian jihadists in April 2013 to form the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.”

The ongoing violence in Iraq comes after several months of instability over longstanding grievances against the government. Run by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq has seen a mixture of protests and bombs after the US pullout in December 2011. Accused of being a Shia Saddam Hussein, Maliki is resented by Sunni Arabs in Iraq who accuse the government of marginalization and arbitrary arrest of Sunni Iraqis.

Iraq’s insurgency is seen by some as a result of the Syrian Civil War. Those who have called for military intervention in Syria include no other than Tony Blair. The former British prime minister has unsurprisingly claimed that violence in Iraq is a result of the West’s failure to intervene in Syria, and not the Iraq War itself.

Time and time again, Blair fails to understand that guns and bombs do not solve conflicts in the Arab and Muslim world. The consequences of the Syrian Civil War threaten to see a repeat of the Libyan conflict’s aftermath, with the potential of further arms trafficking in the heart of the Middle East. Indeed, repercussions from the conflict have already been felt in Iraq. An intervention of some sort will only pour oil on burning flames and send the region into yet another whirlpool of bloodshed.

In this interview, Fair Observer’s managing editor, Abul-Hasanat Siddique, speaks to Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, reader in Comparative Politics and International Relations at the School of Oriental and Africa Studies, University of London, and the chair of the Centre for Iranian Studies at the London Middle East Institute.

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Tony Blair recently said that ISIS’ advances in Iraq are a result of the West’s failure to intervene in Syria, and not the Iraq War itself. Do Blair’s claims hold any validity?

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam: If Tony Blair would have had the acumen and intellectual capacity to comprehend this part of the world, he would not have made the strategic mistake of contributing to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the first place. The inability of the Iraqi state to deal with ISIS and other security threats is a direct result of the post-war devastation, which the invasion of 2003 fostered.

Time and time again, Blair fails to understand that guns and bombs do not solve conflicts in the Arab and Muslim world … An intervention of some sort will only pour oil on burning flames and send the region into yet another whirlpool of bloodshed.  

— Abul-Hasanat Siddique

The incompetent handling of the aftermath of the war; the anarchy that ensued; the inability of the occupying forces to sustain the institutional infrastructure of Iraq after the demise of Saddam Hussein; and the sectarian wheeling and dealing this strategic inertia provoked are the main reasons why Nouri al-Maliki is presiding over a quasi-state, a rump army and an ineffectual bureaucracy. Iraq’s institutions were nullified and then stunted by war and occupation. The vacuum thus created was penetrated by movements such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and now ISIS. Indeed, the current core leadership of ISIS, including Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, are products of the terror that Iraqi society was put through during the war and thereafter.

Iraq did not benefit from a Marshall Plan or pax Americana — a sustained security and economic commitment that would have been needed to manage the post-war anarchy. Japan and Germany were endowed with such systems of relative stability. Iraq was not, despite the direct responsibility of the Bush and Blair administrations for the devastation of the country. It is understandable, of course, that Blair is worried about his legacy; hence his efforts to change the narrative that puts him, with reference to Iraq, on the wrong side of history.

Siddique: If the Middle East breaks up, involving a redrawing of Sykes and Picot’s lines in the sand, what will the region look like? And what will this mean for the new states’ security and economies?

Adib-Moghaddam: I don’t anticipate any major alteration of the map in West Asia and North Africa. ISIS is a transitory phenomenon and will be dealt with by regional states and international society. Both emphasize the sovereignty and legitimacy of nation-states. I have explained how this sovereignty principle, which is enshrined in the international system, manifests itself in reifying the geopolitical status quo in the region and beyond in my first book on security in the Persian Gulf. The two most prominent movements — pan-Arabism in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era and pan-Islamism after the Iranian Revolution — which were far more potent that ISIS is, never really altered the map of the region, despite short-lived experiments such as the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt in the late 1960s. In the end: raison d’état trumped transnational loyalties in the name of an Arab or Islamic umma (nation).

Having said that, regional states such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and even Jordan continue to struggle with a legitimacy deficit, exactly because they are considered to be inventions of the colonial order. Regional states must think seriously about transcending narrow definitions of nationhood. What is needed is a new politics of transnational convergence, which reifies the security of states in response to the demands of civil societies, and an intellectual and political consciousness that appreciates the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious entanglements — which millennia of interaction between the peoples of this area have brought about.

The reality is that we devastated Iraq, which will have knock-on effects for generations to come, and we shirked our responsibility thereafter.

— Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Siddique: Will the violence in Syria and Iraq spread even further to neighboring states? Does ISIS pose a threat to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the West?

Adib-Moghaddam: ISIS is a terror threat, but not a strategic one to the stability of the region and beyond. Movements that are based on an ideology of violence, which is essentially homicidal, will never be anything else because they lack the popular base to transmute into something different. Ultimately, ISIS is an aberration that was only possible because of the inability of regional states — in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia — to forge a viable security architecture that does not operate in accordance with a zero-sum mentality, which prescribes antagonistic politics. The emergence of ISIS is also down to the incompetence of the US and the European Union to deal with the post-war anarchy in Iraq comprehensively, as previously indicated.

Iraq was invaded as a security problem and the country was never treated as anything but. There was no holistic reconstruction plan to aid the country after the devastation that we caused. Aiding it, incidentally, not only in terms of security — which in itself never really happened systematically — but also in terms of a comprehensive, dedicated and long-term humanitarian effort. Going back to what Tony Blair said: We never accepted our responsibility toward Iraqis exactly because politicians like him blur the lines in the sand, which they themselves drew with so much vehemence and conviction. The reality is that we devastated Iraq, which will have knock-on effects for generations to come, and we shirked our responsibility thereafter.

Siddique: The conflicts in both Syria and Iraq are often seen amid a greater ideological standoff between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. What interests do both states have in the Middle East in terms of a regional power struggle?

Adib-Moghaddam: The Sunni-Shia divide is a very mediocre way to explain what is currently happening in the region. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran goes beyond such matters and is driven by conflicting interests throughout West Asia and North Africa. For a Shia-majority country such as Iran, it does not make sense to self-consciously restrict the foreign policy orbit of the country to a minority sect within the Muslim umma (i.e. the Shia). Iran has grander aspirations than that. Neither does the Assad regime act in accordance with a sectarian mentality, exactly because such a policy would alienate all non-Alawite communities. Hence the emphasis on Baathism and pan-Arabism in the Syrian case, and a pan-Islamic, third world communitarianism in Iran’s case.

These ideational planks expand rather than conscribe to the geostrategic habitat that both countries can act upon. Saudi Arabian foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq and Syria is tactical, almost reactionary, with no clear goal apart from containing Iranian influence. Hence, the erratic support to several movements in Syria without much success on the ground.

The fact is that neither Saudi Arabia, nor Iran can go it alone in these strategic theaters. Both are nullifying themselves and wasting precious resources to entrench the current stalemate. Obviously, movements such as ISIS benefit from this constellation. Whilst Iran and Saudi Arabia are shadow boxing with each other, ISIS, unrestrained by international law and norms, is throwing real punches on the ground. What is needed is a strategic dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The long-term aim of all of this should be a security community, which would safeguard a formal respite from war.

The practical pathways to that end can be chartered along two concepts: Cultural diplomacy and trans-identitarian politics, which are carried by an inclusive discourse that is non-sectarian and subdues ultra-nationalistic narratives, within a globalized context that would require stressing security interdependencies — an understanding that insecurity is transnational. In an increasingly networked and interlinked world, the security of state A in West Asia cannot be treated in isolation to the security of state B in Europe. This requires a positive understanding of security that is framed by internationalism; an understanding that security cannot be achieved in isolation, or at the expense of the most powerful actors of the international system.

This refers to a shift away from a zero-sum game — a situation in which one participant’s gains result only from another participant’s equivalent losses — to a positive sum game: No one wins at someone else’s expense. Indeed, the sum of positives and negatives (wins and losses) is positive. This is what the civil societies in the region deserve and demand, and it is about time that regional leaders hone their responsibility to that end.

*[Note: Arshin Adib-Moghaddam is the author of “On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today” (2013) and “A Critical Introduction to Khomeini” (ed. 2014).]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The month of Ramadan is in full swing. Muslims around the world, male and female, will abstain from eating, drinking and having sexual intercourse between dawn and sunset until the end of July. Based on one of the five pillars of Islam, siyam (fasting) in Ramadan is compulsory for those who are physically able to do it.

Beyond such basic knowledge of the month lies the “politics” of Ramadan. No, we are not talking about sectarian conflict among Sunnis and Shi’ites in the Middle East. Rather, the politics of Ramadan sees Muslims themselves separating the month from its original meanings.

Spiritually, Ramadan is a time of meditation, inner peace and sadaqah (charity). It is a month for personal reflection and a chance to become closer to God, and it is a moment for family and community. This may involve simply sitting in a mosque alone, reading the Qur’an or volunteering at charities. The month of Ramadan is a point where one should not only abstain from food, water and sex, but rather from doing anything that is deemed sinful such as lying, cheating or backbiting.

Instead of seeing fasting as a chore, followers of Islam are taught to remember those in the world — Muslim and non-Muslim — who essentially fast every day not as an obligation, but rather because they live in war, hunger and poverty. As Ayesha Almazroui succinctly puts it: “The true meaning of fasting is to experience hunger; to feel humility and compassion towards the poor.”

Overeating and Obesity

However, when we see practices of some Muslims during Ramadan, the festival threatens to move away from its spirituality and instead into a month of excessive consumption. While the common belief among many is that a huge feast is served at iftar (breaking of the fast), Islam actually teaches that we should not overeat, for the meaning of the month is to show patience, restraint and humbleness. Instead, eating should always be done in moderate proportions, for even the Prophet Muhammad is noted as saying: “Nothing is worse than a person who fills his stomach. It should be enough for the son of Adam to have a few bites to satisfy his hunger. If he wishes more, it should be: one-third for his food, one-third for his liquids, and one-third for his breath.”

Today, for example, Ramadan often sees binge eating and wastage by Muslims throughout the world — with consumption said to increase by 30%. In Qatar, it has become an annual occurrence for people to be hospitalized from eating too much at iftar and suhoor (pre-dawn meal). As for wastage, Dubai sees an extra 20% of food in its landfill sites during Ramadan alone, while year round the United Arab Emirates wastes a high proportion of food. Authorities in Abu Dhabi have even called for citizens to reduce the amount of food they waste.

Moreover, according to a study by the United Nations, Gulf States are among the most obese in the world, with Kuwait followed by Saudi Arabia being the highest in the region. Obesity in the Gulf is not only caused by high summer temperatures that mean people often stay indoors to enjoy leisure activities. Rather, a lavish lifestyle with widely available junk food and a lack of physical activity is a leading cause.

This culture of binge eating among Arabs and Muslims living in the East and West has led to what some have dubbed the commercialization of Ramadan. The holy month sees increased advertising, hiked prices and huge buffets at hotels in the Middle East. Amid Arabic soap operas that have viewers glued to the TV set due to reduced working hours in Ramadan, mass advertising campaigns are a key feature. In 2009, Egypt spent $146 million on adverts during Ramadan — a 62% rise on previous months. With people sitting indoors, it is little wonder that television bosses rub their hands together and watch the dollars and dinars roll in.

Even in Mecca, Islam’s holiest city, historical sites have been demolished to pave the way for skyscrapers. The increasing number of luxury hotels charge extortionate amounts during Ramadan due to pilgrims flocking to the city. Of course, companies should always analyze market trends and capitalize on demand. This is key to any economy that seeks to boost its growth and always move toward further development. However, as Jaweed Kaleem states, such policies by Saudi authorities have led to “discussions of excess in a faith that emphasizes simplicity and accessibility.”

With petrodollars in the Gulf, splashing cash at luxury hotels is not an issue for those who can afford it, but the true meaning of Ramadan is being lost in the process. For those concerned about consumption and commercialization in Ramadan, the month of fasting threatens to be turned into the month of overeating and excessive prices.

*[This article was originally published by Your Middle East.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Over one year ago, Casper Wuite and I became published authors when our book, The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, was released. An incredible feat for the two of us aside, the revolts that swept the Middle East and North Africa from December 17, 2010, have certainly been the most seismic event of the 21st century so far. Indeed, as we mentioned in the book, the impact of the revolts will continue to be felt for decades.

A Primer

Looking at the uprisings from the other side of the tunnel as 2014 is in full swing, one can see results that have failed to meet the initial optimism that activists and analysts both rightfully envisioned.

Tunisia continues to see political uncertainty with Mehdi Jomaa set to become the new caretaker prime minister. His task will be to form an interim government that will satisfy all parties — a formidable challenge for a country that not too long ago was dubbed the model for Arab nations coming off a political transition.

The National Constituent Assembly in Tunisia has struggled to agree upon a comprehensive draft constitution that is accepted by all actors, while terrorist attacks — once unthinkable in the tiny Maghreb nation — and politically-driven murders have been a reoccurring nightmare. Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Uprisings, is in a state of flux. Beyond civil unrest in Tunis and Sidi Bouzid in December 2013, lawmakers have received death threats as the assembly struggles to agree upon a constitution that is deemed satisfactory by Islamist and secular parties.   

In Egypt, the so-called "deep state" has made a comeback as the military is back on the scene after a coup d'état against an Islamist president who forcefully imposed his — and his party's — controversial and authoritarian policies upon resilient Egyptians. Egypt's military rulers, under the face of interim President Adly Mansour, have brought back much-hated and oppressive laws, including a controversial curbing of protests as well as a recent state of emergency. Aside from the mass arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters that have been criticized by human rights organizations, youth activists of the 2011 uprising were recently handed suspended sentences — the imprisoned blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah was one of them.

The spirit of Tahrir Square, which donned the colors of the Egyptian flag and brought down a long-standing military dictator in Hosni Mubarak, has indeed faded into the abyss. Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were certainly not the right leaders for Egypt as they upheld their own dictatorial and inexperienced policies at the expense of everyday Egyptians.

However, neither is the repressive military under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi — the same military that countless Egyptians stood against on many occasions one year prior. If Tunisia is in a state of flux, Egypt's so-called "revolution" has taken more than two steps back. Should Sisi run for office — as is expected by some analysts — all eyes would turn towards revolutionary groups to see if they would accept such an outcome, even if it comes via the ballot box.  

Meanwhile, Libya's government has failed to enforce a solid security strategy, while arms trade and proliferation are a significant concern for Mediterranean countries and sub-Saharan Africa. The vast majority of militias that were involved in the civil war did not disarm and have since sought to challenge the state's security forces. Weapons from Libya have even made their way to West Africa and the Levant. In fact, these same militias managed to destabilize neighboring Mali and drag the country down into its own conflict. Alarmingly, Tripoli's inadequate security policy meant that the country's prime minister, Ali Zeidan, was recently kidnapped by extremists.

Tribal militias had even managed to block 80% of Libya's oil exports for months on end, while the country's daily output plummeted severely throughout 2013.

The demise of Libya's security situation has a number of implications not only for the wider region, but also for everyday Libyans as threats of a second civil war are not farfetched.

If the Libyan government fails to curb armed militias — of nearly a few thousand — and secure the abundance of weapons throughout the country, Libya will not progress economically. Libya is in dire need of investment and infrastructure as the country needs to be rebuilt. It is quite clear that foreign companies will think twice about investing in a nation that is severely unstable. The outcome will be a likely increase in unemployment and, as a result, the Libyan people will grow more and more restive. For southern Europe, this will mean an increase in migrants sailing across the Mediterranean.   

Yemen's transition in a post-Saleh era is still marred by corruption, violence and drones. President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi — who was elected in a farcical one-horse race in February 2012 after a GCC-led transition agreement that forced Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down — is overt regarding US drone strikes in Yemen. In fact, when visiting Washington, D.C. in September 2012, Hadi praised and all but welcomed the attacks by stating: "They pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you’re aiming at."

Aside from the moral implications of US drone warfare, Yemen's security situation is clearly of core concern to regional states as well as the international community. Any rise in terrorism-related activity in Yemen has the potential to impact upon Western interests in the Gulf but also abroad, as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed bomb attempt in 2009 showed. However, a "zero margin of error" is definitely a false assertion by President Hadi when a wedding party can be mistakenly hit by a drone strike. Hadi is simply a new face for an old, corrupted regime.

Bahrain's al-Khalifa family continues to rule with its oppressive hand. The Gulf kingdom's Shi'a majority has a right to stand up against the state when it fails to cater for all its citizens. Indeed, Manama's human rights record is nothing short of atrocious.

With arbitrary arrest and military-style trials of civilians, Bahrain has managed to present its political unrest as a sectarian issue with Iran at the forefront. While Iran does hold its own agenda over the nation's unrest, a sectarian-led explanation for Bahrain's uprising is far from the truth.

The majority Shi'a population are wrongfully discriminated against and treated as third-class citizens. With all moral issues of human rights abuse aside, Bahrain should empower its Shi'a populace to reduce the much-warranted grievances against the Khalifa family. A united population is imperative for economic growth and social cohesion.  

As civil war in the Levant approaches its third anniversary, it is Syria which is perhaps the most heartbreaking story of what Marc Lynch had dubbed the "Arab Spring" — a term which he himself admitted was not an accurate assessment of the region's uprisings. As battles rage on between forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and armed opposition fighters — consisting of Syrians and non-Syrians, including Islamists, Salafists and the drowned-out voices of secularists — it is the innocent bystanders of the war who have to bear the brunt of both sides' brutality, unending violence, and unyielding stance.

While NATO hit the trigger alarmingly fast in Libya without giving diplomacy a thorough try, the international community has failed to diplomatically bring about peace in Syria. As hopes of a ceasefire in the upcoming Geneva conference fade, the civil war sees no end in sight as innocent men, women and children watch their lives being torn apart on a daily basis.

The Fruits of the "Spring"

Indeed, Syria is the tragedy story of the so-called "Arab Spring," with over 130,000 people having been killed by Assad loyalists and armed opposition fighters. However, while the third anniversary of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation has passed, it is worthwhile to assess the Arab Uprisings in a "then" and "now" fashion.

As each nation's uprising or political unrest differed in terms of its specific causes and outcomes, it is imperative to look upon the countries on an individual basis and evaluate how they have progressed from 2010/11 until now, while also providing suggestions for each nation on a social, political and economic basis.

What will follow as 2014 surges forward is a series of articles which tackle exactly that — on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, as well as Morocco, Algeria and Jordan. Such a comprehensive analysis of these nations is necessary as the fruits of the "Spring" have not been met — at least not yet.     

*[This article was produced in partnership with the Foreign Policy Association.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Is the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa home-grown or a Western-sponsored revolution for change?

Abul-Hasanat Siddique: Home-grown. Seeing the uprisings in the region as Western-sponsored “revolutions” is far from reality. Firstly, that view sees the populations in the region as passive recipients. It also negates the Arab people, particularly its youth populations, in their moment when they called or are still calling for freedom and dignity. That would also not do justice to the way foreign governments and local populations have acted on the ground.

In fact, Arab youth movements and political activists have been mobilising for many years. The April 6th Movement in Egypt has been on the scene since 2008. Autocratic regimes in the region, most of whom are backed by the West, have long ignored their disgruntled people. Revolts were bound to happen at some point in the Arab world; a region which has seen poor economic growth, atrocious human rights records, and a growing youth population with high unemployment. Such issues have boiled up and created restive societies throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Casper Wuite: What is true is that in some countries, particularly Libya, home grown revolutions with enough critical mass could simply not to be ignored by the West. The action the West subsequently undertook, however, was never part of a Cold War-type strategy to sponsor certain elements in the region.

Is the Middle East in a phase of transition from “dictatorship to democracy”? If so, will the Arab Uprisings pave the way for transitions in Syria, Jordan, and then Saudi Arabia as well?

Siddique: The plenitude of elections held in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in no way signifies a democracy, but merely a first step. True democratic reform takes a substantial amount of time to achieve; the history of Europe is a key example. Some parts of the region are in this long transitional period. The transitions occurring in countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have been rather complicated. However, in time, these countries will make (some) shifts towards democratic reform. This may take several years or even decades to achieve and it will not be easy.

Wuite: The Arab Uprisings are less likely to pave the way for transitions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia although incremental changes have been made particularly in Jordan. Yes, they face the same challenges: a demographic youth bulge and an economic reality that is increasingly at odds with the regime’s existing policies and practices. However, calls for reform are diluted by political and fiscal co-optation in both countries. On the other hand, in Syria the question is not so much whether we will see a transition soon, but rather whether a stable democracy will be its endpoint.

In your view, is Morsi capable of keeping a balance between Islamists and liberal forces within Egypt? Does Egypt dream of becoming a regional power under Morsi, as was the case during the Gamal Abdul Nasser era?

Siddique: At present, the president is clearly failing to keep the balance between the Islamist bloc and the liberal and secular forces. Post-Mubarak Egypt has further highlighted political polarization  in the country. The political unrest over Morsi’s rather inexperienced and poor strategic move with his presidential decree and the ensuing referendum over the new constitution, has further deepened this polarization. Indeed, Egypt’s transition is very complicated and the judiciary is full of former Mubarak-era officials. But there are undoubtedly many within Egypt who are disengaged with Morsi, as they simply see him as a stooge for the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies. What he needs to do is truly engage all groups within Egypt, including secularists, liberals, women, and religious minorities. Indeed, he is the president for all Egyptian people and not one portion of society; he needs to realise this if Egypt is to move forward. Unilateral steps like initiating presidential decrees will not help Egypt; it will simply evoke more and more unrest and resentment within the country.

He also needs to reform the police and security forces. The unrest over the Port Said trials was a reaction against Morsi’s presidency, but also at the corrupt police and security forces. Whether or not Morsi made a deal with the military is up for question, but he very much needs to pursue those responsible for the death of protestors in 2011, and those still unaccounted for. The people want justice to be served.

Wuite: Indeed, many have argued that the current riots are a sign that the standoff between Morsi and the opposition is spiralling out of control. However, not every rioter is a member of either two groups. Many rioters are hooligans upset with the Port Said trials, or are youth settling scores with the police. Yet, one cannot deny that the political polarization is increasingly paralysing the country. What is thus instrumental in understanding the crisis, is that it is not simply that the political arena has lost its primacy of settling disputes to the streets. What has been crucial to the current standoff has been the extent to which democratic procedures and the rule of law have lost their primacy and how the remaining institutions, most notably the judiciary, have been politicized and turned into political fiefdoms.

Siddique: As for Nasser. Domestically, Morsi falls far short of living up to Nasser’s legacy within Egypt despite the late leader having been a dictator himself. Nasser is still held high within the country but also within the wider Arab world. With regards to being a regional power once again: Morsi clearly sees that Qatar and Turkey are making advances in becoming the regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the fore-front of regional affairs, and Egypt has been in a complicated transitional period for over two years. However, it is highly unlikely that Egypt will return to the heights of Nasser’s pan-Arab dream. Simply put, pan-Arabism, as Nasser dreamed of it, is dead — it has been dead for decades.

That said, Morsi wants to develop further foreign ties. If his domestic policy fails, he at least wants his foreign policy to be worth something. If his foreign policy is to be deemed a “success”, however, a drastic development needs to be made with the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process. Pressure will need to put on the Palestinians, namely Hamas, while the US will finally need to act as a genuine peace broker.

Did the Syrian conflict begin as a genuine uprising or a proxy-war? Will Bashar al-Assad fall to the opposition as with Libya?

Siddique: A genuine uprising that has turned into a proxy-war.There is a belief by some that the Syrian Civil War was instigated by a Western-led conspiracy to overthrow the Ba’athist regime in a bid to derail its ally in Iran. Notably, this is the same view held by Bashar al-Assad and his aides. The problem with that belief completely negates the start of the unrest in Syria, and the history of the country under the Assad family. Let us not forget that the Syrian people rose up peacefully in a bid for genuine reforms as their counterparts had done so in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and so on. But they were met with force from the state. As time went by, some in the opposition took up arms to defend themselves. At the same time, however, some radical and extremist elements (with an affiliation to Al-Qaeda) in the Syrian opposition (some foreign) have capitalised on the conflict and begun calling for an Islamic state.

The Syrian people, those opposing the Ba’athist government, be they secular or Islamist, have genuine grievances against the Assad family which has been in power for over 40 years. Viewing the whole war, from the initial peaceful uprising, as a Western conspiracy ignores those grievances and sees the Syrian people as passive bystanders. The Syrian people should not be seen as a pawn for the US, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, but instead as people who want their freedom and dignity.

As for Assad falling like Qaddafi did in Libya: the situation is different. The opposition in Libya had a base of “operations” in Benghazi. From there, they made advances westwards and were then backed by NATO airstrikes. That isn’t the case in Syria, as the armed opposition have only seized fragments across the country. There are also divisions within their ranks. In addition, while the Syrian Uprising did not begin as a sectarian battle, sections of the protagonists on the ground now see the civil war as a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites (and the wider Shi’a region). If Assad does fall, there is a genuine fear that the Alawite community could be targeted by extremists. Unlike Libya, the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict today has meant that sections within Assad’s ranks are reluctant to defect to the opposition, and will continue to be reluctant unless genuine security promises are made. With the current stalemate, the civil war could last for a substantial amount of time. As with the Algerian and Lebanese civil wars, a negotiated settlement seems to be the only way forward. Whether the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition agree to any settlement is highly questionable.    

How do you view the role of media coverage in “bridging the gaps” or “widening the gulf” in the Middle East?

Siddique: News media coverage and social media has been quite key in the Arab Uprisings, and with modern conflicts in general. A cousin of Mohammed Bouazizi — the Tunisian street seller whose self-immolation ignited the uprising in Sidi Bouzid — highlighted this very well. The cousin had sent mobile phone footage of the aftermath of Bouazizi’s self-immolation to Al Jazeera, who broadcasted it. Subsequent videos were sent to the broadcaster of the unrest in Sidi Bouzid. But as the cousin highlighted: protests in the Arab world are not unheard of, at least in the country (in question) itself. However, if the footage of the unrest hadn’t been shown on the news, it would have been as if protests hadn’t happened. It’s the whole “tree falling in the woods” issue: if no one hears about a protest, did it really happen?

And it is due to this, the globalisation of media and its technological developments, that coverage of what is happening on the ground can be disseminated on an astonishing scale. Social media, and the wide-availability of satellite television, has allowed for videos, messages, and so, to be distributed to wide-spanning audiences much faster. This didn’t happen in the 1977 Bread Riots, or even in the Gulf War; the Gulf War was CNN’s moment to shine — there was no pan-Arab broadcaster like Al Jazeera. However, today, the biggest factor is that autocratic regimes can’t control these media developments. They have been hit by the reality of globalisation. Media is indeed helping to “bridge the gaps” between what the state allows and what its people want; the people who are getting the message out by whatever means necessary. Protests or conflict, no matter how big or small they are, will now always be “heard”.

How do you see the future scenario of the Middle East? Will stability be reached or will anarchy prevail?

Wuite: I agree with Stephen Waltz who argues that future scenarios of the Middle East can roughly be divided into three situations. Optimists will argue that the road will be bumpy for a while, but that the Arab Uprisings mark the end of an era of regional stagnation and will give way for economic development and liberal democracy. Others exercise more caution and argue that as political dynamism returns to the region, we should be careful of what we wish for. In other words, under the influence of popular sentiment, more capable and competent Arab regimes will not necessarily be more compliant. Lastly, pessimists will argue that although the Arab Uprisings will succeed in overturning a number of regimes, stable governance will not replace them everywhere. Instead, extremism and sectarianism will be rife in some countries.

Personally, I believe that any positive change will only be incremental and that given the state of the economy, social and regional polarization, and continued fiscal and political co-optation in the region, we should be cautious when it comes to the outcomes of the Arab Uprisings in most countries and flatly pessimistic when it comes to some others.

*[The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

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As the Arab Uprisings enter their third year, the face of the region, marred by political and economic decay, is slowly changing. What is most surprising about the revolts is that the protests had no leaders, no real agenda other than the overthrow of the existing regimes, and only a vague aspiration for economic and political reform. “Mobilization and communication took place in diverse ways through the Internet and cell phones, not through political manifestos.”

The ultimate success of the Arab Uprisings will be determined by whether a new balance of power between the government, the army, and different sectarian and ethnic groups can bring such economic and political development. So far, progress is hard-fought, and tensions have flared up easily; Egypt being a point in case. However, if expectations are not managed and socio-economic grievances not addressed, a new political crisis is not unfathomable, not only in Egypt but also in surrounding countries.

Many commentators have pointed to the Arab monarchies who have fared considerably better in the face of protests than their republican counterparts. “In reality, however, the political and economic structures that underpin these highly autocratic states are coming under increasing pressure, and broad swathes of citizens are making hitherto unimaginable challenges to the ruling elites.”

Jordan presents a pressing issue, with the recent wave of political unrest being directed at King Abdullah. Although it is unlikely that Amman will follow the path of its neighbors, the position of Jordan is vital for actors in the international community. As the international community has so far failed to halt the violence in Syria through diplomatic efforts, the civil war could potentially last for some time. With violence spilling over into Lebanon, regional stability is at stake. Notably, at the time of writing, the Israel-Palestine conflict is also coming to the fore again in Gaza.

Aside from the violence, however, the Arab Uprisings represent a profound moment where leaders have been ousted and political dynamics are changing. The long journey towards an inclusive democratic system will not happen overnight, but will take decades to fully achieve. One thing is for sure though, the Arab Uprisings have been a remarkable feat of collective people power. The “Arab Street” has spoken; change is inevitable.The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.

The post The Arab Street Has Spoken: Change is Inevitable appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Arab Uprisings have changed the political landscape in the region and created a new reality for the international community. Earlier, “a soft bigotry of lowered expectations in the West and among Arab elites,” assumed that democracy was not possible in the region. Stability was championed over democracy using the specter of an Islamist threat as an excuse to promote strategic interests. Arab countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to popular aspirations. Arab populations, in turn, saw their governments as corrupt, secular puppets of Western power. Anti-Western sentiments were rife.

The Arab Uprisings will herald a more equal relationship between Arab countries and the West. Regardless of whether regimes have changed or not, Arab countries will reflect popular sentiment to a greater degree and will be more aggressive in asserting their sovereignty.

Implications for the International Community

After two years of uprisings, the emerging political order in the Middle East is marked by considerable shifts of power both within individual countries as well as at the regional level. Some old actors remain, some new actors are emerging, and some others are fading away.

The US

The United States face a situation where some of its key allies in the Arab world have been ousted. Their influence and position in the region is being reevaluated. “The dilemma for the United States and its allies has been and is to maintain existing working relations with the Palace for shared concerns on trade and security while recognizing that they will have to pay homage increasingly to citizen movements, which at their core demand more influence on the affairs of the State.”

Core US interests in the region are threefold: natural resources; security for Israel; and counter-terrorism and regional security measures. US interests in natural resources are largely unaffected. Oil-rich Gulf kingdoms remain intact. “So far the [uprisings have] caused minimal disruptions of the oil market because Gulf producers, principally Saudi Arabia, have made up for supply losses from Libya… Nonetheless, these events pose the question of how much disruption from such events can the market absorb before the repercussions are widespread.” If political upheaval spreads and affects the Arabian Peninsula, the global markets for natural resources could turn highly volatile.

Israel’s security is a core concern for the US. The election of an Islamist Egyptian president backed by the Muslim Brotherhood puts into question the US relationship with Egypt. It also creates uncertainty over the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

“The [uprisings have] called into question Israel’s relative stability of the past several years. In Egypt, the prospect now is for a popular government more critical of Israel. There is no question that the Egyptian public is hostile to Israel, believing that Israel has not maintained its part of the treaty.”

The US faces a dilemma with a new Egyptian government that will not be as compliant as the Hosni Mubarak regime. The diplomatic relationship with Egypt has been thrown into question. As President Barack Obama declared: “I don’t think that we would consider [the new Egyptian government] an ally, but we don’t consider them an enemy.” The relationship between the US and Egypt has so far not faltered and it is in the best interests of both countries to maintain stable diplomatic ties. However, as stated by former Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, “the era of ‘yes sir’ has to come to an end.”

Counterterrorism in the region is an ongoing policy goal for the US. Drone attacks targeting Al-Qaeda members continue in Yemen. Bahrain is a key ally for Washington because it allows the US to counter Iranian influence. It is for this reason that, for all the talk of supporting democratic reform, the US continues to support the Bahraini Sunni monarchy despite its repression of the Shi’a population.

Read the final excerpt from The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction on February 4, 2013.

The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.

The post The United States and the Arab Uprisings appeared first on Fair Observer.

For decades, elites have captured the state to serve their interests in the Arab world. Institutions and the rule of law have been lacking. Transparency in government procedures and political pluralism has been absent. In Libya, “informal ties and a lack of institutions” have impaired the functional capacity of the state completely. Institutions are urgently needed in Libya but throughout the Arab world, major challenges in governance need to be addressed to create an effective state. This will only be possible if the different factions within each country come to an understanding with each other, and compromise individual interests for the collective good of the country.

Civil Control Over the Military or Militias (Egypt, Libya, and Yemen)

In many regimes, the military has acquired a certain “political pivotalness” such as in Egypt and in Yemen. “The very resources and privileges that enable soldiers to suppress the regime’s opposition also empower them to act against the regime itself.” As such, in many countries, control over the military by civilian governments has been weak. In Libya, after a period of civil war, many militias are still operating outside government control. Reforming the state must mean restoring civilian authority over the armed forces.

Reform of the Justice System (All Countries)

The hegemony of the executive over the judiciary and the establishment of special and military tribunals have eroded individual rights, destroyed due process, and eliminated a fair trial in criminal, civil, and administrative matters. A new justice system is urgently needed along with law enforcement reform. The police have long been an instrument of oppression and their powers have to be trimmed drastically. Detention, torture, arbitrary arrest and exemption from the rule of law have to be consigned to the dustbin of history. New transparent systems based on protecting individual liberties have to be created. The culture of wielding power with impunity and immunity has to end, and those who have committed human rights violations have to be held accountable.

Economic Development and Social Welfare

The most important challenge for the region is fostering economic growth that leads to employment generation and poverty alleviation. So far, “ruling elites in the region have captured key segments of the economy and created an entrenched rent seeking system of crony capitalism.” The state has smothered entrepreneurship through corruption and regulation. It has also neglected public services such as healthcare, education, and housing.

At the same time, “rapid demographic growth over the past three decades, in combination with a dramatic increase in the number of educated job seekers, has imposed critical challenges on Arab regimes” that they have been unable to deal with.

High unemployment, rampant poverty, and a lack of public services in fast growing urban settings have created widespread discontent especially among a growing youth population. The World Bank estimates that the region will need to create 50 million jobs over the next decade to ensure social and political stability. The new governments are racing against the clock and will have to start reforming their economies as soon as they assume power.

Read the fourth excerpt from The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction on January 28, 2013.

The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available to purchase at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.

The post After the Arab Uprisings appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Arab Uprisings have fundamentally altered the balance of power in the region. Traditionally, the main powers in the Middle East have been Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Now, there are new actors vying for a greater role in the region. Qatar is looking to play a greater diplomatic role in the Middle East and beyond, while Turkey has been touted as a role model for Arab countries embarking on the long road of democratic reforms. Because of the resurgence of sectarianism, Shi’a Iran still remains a key power in the region.

Qatar’s Riches

Qatar is a small nation in the Arabian Peninsula with the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world and a superb infrastructure. It is the richest country in the world in terms of per capita income, thanks to its low population and a GDP swelled by an abundance of natural resources. Qatar’s wealth has ensured that there have been no uprisings in the country despite the fact that it continues to be an absolute monarchy, albeit one that supports democratic reform abroad.

Qatar has played a key diplomatic role in various uprisings, particularly in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars. It has sought to reinvent itself as the key diplomatic player by outdoing its neighbor, Saudi Arabia.

As The Guardian observes:

“Qatar has attempted to position itself at the forefront of the transformation of the region, giving military support to the opposition to Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Libya as well as backing key players in the country’s fractured post-revolutionary politics through tactics – some diplomats have alleged – that have included weapons shipments. More recently, it has been accused of funneling arms to Syria’s opposition groups – a claim the prime minister denies, despite the fact that Qatar vocally supports the arming of that country’s opposition.”

Indeed, Qatar’s support of pro-democracy movements in the Arab world while remaining an absolute monarchy itself, has led to questions about its motives. With a population of less than 2 million, most of who are not native Qatari citizens, the country has sought to establish closer allies in the region and beyond. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani recently visited the Gaza Strip. It was the first visit to Gaza by a head of state since Hamas came to power. Significantly, the Emir pledged $400 million for construction projects in the Palestinian territory. Jane Kinninmont of Chatham House observes:“There is a feeling that it needs a lot of allies. So Qatar pursues alliances both with larger countries and smaller ones that it can rely on in places like the UN General Assembly.”

Qatar’s allies in the region are largely the Sunni Arab countries. Significantly, the country has allowed the Taliban to open an office on its soil, courted Israel, maintained contact with Hamas, remained a key US ally, called for direct dialogue between the US and Iran, and maintained economic relations with Tehran.

Samir Boutamdja astutely notes:

“Sheikh Al-Thani understood the [uprisings] as an opportunity to compete for regional supremacy. Turkey, Iran, and Qatar are now jockeying for power. The Emir [of Qatar] is doing everything he can to support the freedom aspirations of the Arab Street. However, this does not make him a democrat, but instead a pragmatic politician who understands the importance of being on the right side of history… the Emir has turned his tiny and politically insignificant Emirate into a diplomatic titan.”

Alongside Saudi Arabia, Qatar is at the forefront of a regional power battle between Sunni and Shi’a nations, with the two GCC countries and Iran vying to be the region’s biggest player. The diplomatic rise of Qatar is shifting the regional balance of power, especially given that it controls the discourse in the region through its ownership of Al Jazeera, the media organization credited with playing a crucial role in the uprisings.

Read the third excerpt from The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction on January 21, 2013.

The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.

The post Qatar’s Riches and the Regional Balance of Power appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Arab Uprisings are the most significant events to occur in the Middle East and North Africa over the past few decades. So far, the change that young protestors called for has been slow to materialize. Either new elites have acquired political power or old regimes still survive. A report by the London School of Economics and Political Science concluded, “Uprisings across the Middle East have not led to any significant shifts towards permanent democracy even where they have toppled dictators.”

There are a number of new realities on the ground though, including the rise of Islamists, the specter of sectarianism and security, and the changing balance of power in the region.

The Rise of Islamists

Islamists did not play a key role in any of the Arab Uprisings. Yet, they have reaped the benefits in the aftermath of the revolts. Islamist parties have received the highest number of votes in most elections held since the uprisings.

Parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have long been the key opposition to the ruling regimes of the past. Through their underground network and as providers of welfare services, Islamists are more organized than the new secular and liberal parties or the still evolving revolutionary youth movements. After years of repression, Islamists are now in the best position to fill the power vacuum. They are winning power not because of their religious agenda but because they are best placed to exploit the social, economic, and political grievances against former dictatorships.

As Rami Khouri notes:

“Islamists winning free and fair elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco is no surprise, because of their massive followings in Arab countries for different reasons; in large because they offered the only feasible outlet for any Arab who was unhappy with prevailing government policies or socio-economic conditions.”

The victory of Islamists in elections brings into question the role of Islam and democracy. For some, Islam will always be incompatible with democracy. Under Islamic law, governance is to be carried out as per the laws of God and not the democratic mandate. For others, Islam is compatible with democracy because they believe that Islam can be placed within the current societal context and adapt to the demands of a modern democracy.

Nader Hashemi makes this argument forcefully:

“The claim, therefore, that Islam is not subject to evolutionary transformation and development – like all religious traditions obviously are – ignores what really matters: the changing socio-economic and political context, which is all important in shaping how Islam/religion manifests itself in different regions of the world, at different moments in time.”

Over the last few decades, there has been a resurgence of Islam as a political ideology in parts of the Muslim world. Islamic societies have arguably become more religious, raising questions about the public role of religion. For instance, will Islamists let others compete freely and fairly in elections once they have power? How do they intend to deal with socio-economic problems? How will they cater for the wider society that includes secularists, liberals, religious minorities, and women? Will shari’a (Islamic law) form a basis for new constitutions? The answers are yet unclear but how political Islam and democracy interact will be a key feature in the post-uprising world.

Read the second excerpt from The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction on January 14, 2013.

The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction is available at Amazon. A paperback version is available at the SlimBooks store.

The post The Rise of Islamists appeared first on Fair Observer.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Gaza: Egypt Under the Regional Spotlight appeared first on Fair Observer.

Background

Egypt experienced a truly historical moment in February 2011 as the longstanding dictator, Hosni Mubarak, relinquished power. Despite hopes of political reform, revolutionaries were instead met by new autocratic rulers in the form of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

As the SCAF, led by Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, asserted its rule over the state, protests continued against military rule, demanding a transition to a civilian-led government. Peaceful demonstrations often culminated in violence, involving Egypt's military. Main highlights of these occurrences include the Maspero demonstrations by Coptic Christians and the Port Said incident, both of which saw dozens killed and injured.

Following the first parliamentary elections since Mubarak's fall, the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group under the previous president, saw its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), win most seats in parliament with over 47%. The win by the Islamist party, along with the electoral success of other Islamic parties including An-Nour and Al-Wasat, drew large opposition from secularists and liberals.

As the long-awaited presidential race drew close in May 2012, the SCAF controversially disqualified various candidates, with the favourites still running for election. The Muslim Brotherhood joined the elections late, despite previously stating that it would not field a candidate. Eventually, Mohammed Morsi ran for the FJP following the disqualification of its initial candidate.

After the first-round of voting was concluded, the two front runners were revealed to the displeasure of many Egyptians. Morsi, an Islamist who the liberals and secularists were highly sceptical of, won the first-round with 24.8%, while Ahmed Shafiq, a former prime minster under Mubarak, won 23.7% of the votes.

Significantly, as the presidential run-off took place, a high court ruling dissolved the Islamist dominated parliament due to assertions that part of the parliament was elected illegally, which meant the SCAF seized full legislative power following a constitutional amendment.

Ever since Morsi beat Shafiq in the run-off in June, the new Egyptian president has been caught in a power struggle with the military.

Why is Egypt's Power Struggle Relevant?

As the court ruling and the decree enacted by the SCAF effectively meant the military seized legislative powers, the role of Morsi was called into question. Despite having officially left the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP once elected president, without the Brotherhood dominated parliament, Morsi lost a key segment of support.

Consequently, the Egyptian president ordered parliament back into session, shortly after being sworn in, and defied the military junta. Morsi’s action prompted the SCAF to call for an emergency session within hours.

The situation ended in a loss for Morsi, as the court ruling was upheld and parliament was still forced to disband. However, the move by the Egyptian leader was considered courageous by some as it defied the military, and as a media stunt by others who saw it as an attempt by Morsi to gain support from revolutionaries.

Significantly, following an attack in the Sinai Peninsula by armed militants that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers at a border post, Morsi boldly forced Tantawi and General Sami Anan into retirement for the army's failure to act when attacked near the border with Israel. The president also ended the constitutional decree enacted by the SCAF that gave the military legislative control, and has instead assumed full presidential powers. He effectively curbed military power by denying the SCAF any say in policymaking, the budget, and the right to choose the constituent assembly.

The Egyptian leader’s move is believed to have been a negotiated settlement, but is seen by others as a clear sacking, as Morsi used the Sinai incident to remove Tantawi from power. Indeed, for some, the president's action was controversial as he now assumes more significant powers. Some analysts see Morsi's move as being the first step towards a Turkey style curbing of the military's role in politics.

In addition, Tantawi and other SCAF officials now face charges by activists over the killing of civilians since Mubarak's ouster.

Due to the Sinai attack, Morsi has now sent soldiers to the peninsula in an operation to purge the region of Islamist militants of Egyptian and foreign origin. The move is particularly significant to Israel since the peace-treaty between the countries does not permit an Egyptian military presence in the Sinai.

On the foreign policy level, Morsi recently travelled to Tehran for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit, the first time an Egyptian president has travelled to Iran since the 1979 Revolution. While the trip was viewed with scepticism by the US and Israel, Morsi affirmed Egypt's strong support for the Syrian opposition in the ongoing civil war, much to the displeasure of the Syrian delegation to the summit, and Iran, a key supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Morsi is aiming to reignite Egypt's role as a regional diplomatic player as he called for the formation of a quartet, which involves Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, to help end the Syrian Civil War.

Meanwhile, Hisham Qandil, the new Egyptian prime minister, recently said he expects to conclude a controversial $4.8bn loan from the IMF within the next two months, along with additional support from the World Bank.

Furthermore, while Egypt is expected to hold new parliamentary elections sometime over the next 12 months, secular and liberal parties are attempting to unite in a bid to beat Islamist political parties. 

Indeed, as the power struggle for Egypt continues, the Morsi Administration face an uphill battle to reform the country. The future of Egypt promises to be a politically complicated affair.
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		Sat, 07 Jul 2012 00:16:40 +0000
				
		
		
		
		

					
A brief look at the modern history of Libya as the country gears up for its first post-Qaddafi election.

Background
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A brief look at the modern history of Libya as the country gears up for its first post-Qaddafi election.

Background

The North African country of Libya gained its independence in 1951 following 40 years of Italian colonial rule. Under Italian control, Libya was divided into three provinces: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. During both World Wars, resistance to Italian occupation and rule was led by Idris al-Mahdi as-Senussi, the Emir of Cyrencaica. Between 1943 and 1951, the British administered Tripolitania and Cyrenaica while Fezzan was under French control.

The UN General Assembly, meanwhile, passed a resolution in 1949 stating Libya should become independent before the start of 1952.  Subsequently, on December 24, 1951, Libya was declared an independent state with a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under as-Sennusi, now known as King Idris.

The new monarch's rule was short lived, however. Despite the discovery of vast oil reserves in 1959 which helped expand the nation's wealth, resentment grew amongst portions of the population who saw the oil revenue falling into the hands of the monarch. Due to the subsequent rise of nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, the relationship between imperial nations and King Idris was seen by some as a threat to Libya's sovereignty.

Consequently, in 1969, Muammar Qaddafi and his Free Officers' Movement staged a coup d’état and ousted King Idris in what came to be known as the Libyan Revolution. Qaddafi, the new ruler of Libya, saw the military coup as the start of a complete transformation of the political, social, and economic principles of the country. The new Libya was described by Qaddafi as a base of Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism, where Libyans would manage their own lives directly and prosper.

In reality, however, Qaddafi ruled Libya with an iron-fist and was the sole decision-maker, along with his group of loyalists. Indeed, the combination of repression and authoritarianism created a system which revolved around the ruler and subjugated significant portions of the population.

The regime refused to tolerate political dissent and soon abolished any political activity against the revolution or the state. Significantly, Qaddafi quashed any Islamic threat to his rule. He restricted the role of the ulema (the clergy) and elevated himself as the authority on religious life.

Qaddafi managed to stamp out opposition from the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, and many members were imprisoned or forced into exile. In 1996, at the main Abu Salim prison, guards killed nearly 1,300 inmates — mostly political prisoners, including Islamists. Abdullah al-Senussi, Qaddafi's brother-in-law, was accused of giving the order to shoot inmates on prison grounds, by a firing-squad. The murder of prisoners at Abu Salim became a rallying call over the years for opposition figures and movements against Qaddafi's rule.

The Libyan regime was also said to have been involved in various terrorist attacks against Western targets including the infamous Lockerbie bombing, which saw the conviction of Abdel-Baset al-Megrahi. Similar incidents over the years saw strained relations with the West, particularly due to Tripoli's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However in 2003, Qaddafi said Libya had abandoned its WMD programme, which effectively opened the door to a new relationship with the West.

Why is Post-Qaddafi Libya Relevant?

Following the ouster of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the Arab uprisings reached Libya in February 2011. The Libyan uprising saw the country become polarised between Qaddafi loyalists and revolutionaries seeking to oust the former leader. A full-scale civil war subsequently ensued with NATO intervening and backing the Libyan opposition with a no-fly-zone. On October 20, 2011, Qaddafi was captured and killed by revolutionary fighters.

An interim government, the National Transitional Council, has since governed Libya. The council announced in October that elections for a constituent assembly would take place in eight months. The elections, on July 7, were initially scheduled to take place at the end of June but were postponed to allow more time for voters to register and to deal with complaints from the multiple candidates.

Several issues, including security concerns, have marred the transition following the civil war. Since a significant proportion of opposition fighters still have access to weapons, there are various militias still present in the country.

The incoming constituent assembly and the new interim government will need to reform various aspects of Libya by enacting social, political, and economic change. Libya lacks established institutions to assist the government in developing the oil rich nation, which has seen its economy become stagnant over the years. Significant areas that are in desperate need of change include the country's security apparatus, unemployment, and the judiciary.   

Despite the issues surrounding Libya's transition in the post-Qaddafi era, the Libyan people have shown resilience by ousting the former dictator and his regime. Moreover, they have shown a willingness to become more politically active in helping to shape their country's future. The transition of Libya promises to be an interesting one.
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		Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:05:47 +0000
				
		
		
		

					The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi has been unveiled as Egypt's first democratically elected president, amidst the dissolution of an Islamist dominated parliament and the controversial constitutional amendments enacted by the SCAF. 

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										The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi has been unveiled as Egypt's first democratically elected president, amidst the dissolution of an Islamist dominated parliament and the controversial constitutional amendments enacted by the SCAF. 

Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's presidential candidate, has been declared as Egypt's new president amid political uncertainty which continues to surround the country. Despite holding free and fair parliamentary elections at the end of 2011, which saw the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) win over 47% of seats, a recent high court ruling has dissolved parliament. Moreover, generals from the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) have implemented a decree which significantly limits the powers of the incoming president.
The presidential run-off saw a battle between an Islamist, Morsi, and a felool (former regime remnant), in Ahmed Shafiq. Farouk Sultan, the Head of the Election Commission, delivered the results as millions of people across Egypt and the Arab world watched on television. The results were delayed for many days following the run-off as the election committee investigated claims of fraud and complaints from both parties. The tally saw Morsi win 51.7% of the vote, while Shafiq received 48.3%. The election, however, only saw a 51% turnout.
Meanwhile, following a high court ruling which dissolved the FJP and Islamist dominated parliament, the SCAF has assumed full legislative power in Egypt. The court declared that one third of parliament was elected illegally and concluded that the entire body should be dissolved. The ruling military junta also implemented constitutional amendments, resulting in only limited executive authority being transferred to Morsi, the president-elect. The SCAF have made it clear that the incoming Egyptian president is not the country's commander-in-chief, which effectively means Morsi has been stripped of his powers. Notably, the military granted itself broad legislative authority, including control over the nation's budget until a new parliament is elected. Currently, the powers of the president-elect are not clearly defined.
Significantly, since there is an absence of a parliament, Morsi would be required to take his oath of office before the Supreme Constitutional Court. However, as noted by Al Jazeera English's Mike Hanna: "To take an oath in front of the court would be to implicitly recognize the constitutional authority of the body that wrote the amendments, [the] SCAF, and at the same time it would acknowledge the legal correctness of the Supreme Court in endorsing these amendments." Subsequently, while clearly knowing the implications of taking the oath in the court, the Brotherhood have reportedly stated that Morsi will take the oath before parliament, since they reject the court's parliamentary ruling and the constitutional amendments. A recent statement from the FJP read: "The constant threat to dissolve a parliament elected by 30 million Egyptians proves that [the] SCAF wants to hold on all powers against popular will."
The high court ruling has been dubbed a coup by opposition figures, including secularists and liberals. As a result of the court's decision – enacted by judges initially appointed by former President Hosni Mubarak – the Brotherhood has lost its key power base in parliament. Mohammed El-Beltagy, a senior FJP figure, called the court ruling and the constitutional amendments a "fully fledged coup," and a ploy for the SCAF to prolong their rule. The former presidential candidate and ex-Brotherhood member, Abdel-Mone'im Aboul-Fotouh argued that: "Overturning the elected parliament after granting the military police the right to arrest is a complete coup and whoever thinks that millions of youth will let it pass is deluding themselves."
Since the constitutional assembly – which has the job of drafting the country's new constitution – is in a state of uncertainty after the dissolution of parliament, many have seen the electing of a new president as pointless since his powers are not defined. Meanwhile, a SCAF advisor recently told Al Jazeera that the new president would be a temporary transitional one, and further elections for a new parliament and president would possibly take place over the next year.
As a result, instead of holding a six year term, Morsi may only be an interim-president, should the military's claimed plans succeed. Mohammed El-Baradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is popular amongst revolutionaries, stated: "The election of a president in the absence of a constitution and a parliament, is the election of a president with powers that not even the most entrenched dictatorships have known." The drafting of a new constitution remains a key issue for the ongoing Egyptian revolution. Since parliament has been dissolved, the constitutional assembly, which was appointed by the parliament, is in disarray. According to analysts, the SCAF is likely to take over the writing of the constitution before holding fresh elections again, much to the displeasure of pro-revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Meanwhile, after pledging that he would resign from the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP, should he become president, the Brotherhood has since confirmed that Morsi is no longer a member of the party. Mahmoud Hussein, the FJP's secretary general, said: "We have terminated Morsi's membership in fulfilment of our promise when he becomes president of all Egyptians."
Morsi, who was imprisoned under Mubarak's regime, was the Muslim Brotherhood's second choice candidate and only stood for the presidency after Khairat El-Shater was disqualified. Since the uprising which ousted the former president began, the Brotherhood has shifted from supporting the revolutionaries, to making friendly overtures to the military and now again supporting the revolution. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood has lost support amongst Islamists, liberals and secularists after they back-tracked on their decision not to field a candidate for the election. This was reflected in the presidential elections, particularly in the first round which saw a drastic drop in votes for the Brotherhood's candidate, compared to the parliamentary elections. The FJP initially stated in 2011 that they would not participate in the presidential vote – which led to the resignation of Aboul-Fotouh – but later fielded El-Shater before Morsi took the candidacy.
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood will need to prove to the Egyptian people that they can safeguard the ongoing revolution, lead the country away from military rule and to respect the freedom and rights of all groups, including religious minorities and women. Moreover, if given the chance, Morsi will need to reform the state and quell fears of an Islamist takeover, and the transformation of Egypt into a theocracy. Gehad El-Haddad, Morsi's campaign spokesman, sought to ease these fears by stating on Al Jazeera English that Egypt would remain a secular state, inclusive of all political and religious groups, including women and Copts. Notably, if this is true, Morsi will need to act fast to gain the trust of all Egyptians.
Indeed, the presidential elections, and in particularly the run-off, has severely polarised Egypt with Brotherhood supporters and revolutionaries on the one side, and supporters of Shafiq (along with many Coptic Christians) and the old regime on the other. After the election commission's announcement, Morsi rightly called for national unity as political uncertainty surrounds Egypt, particularly due to the SCAF's hold on power. "Today I am a president for all Egyptians, wherever they may be," Morsi said in his first address to the nation as president-elect. He went on to state: "The revolution goes on, carries on until all the objectives of the revolution are achieved and together we will complete this march. The people have been patient long enough. I call on you, great people of Egypt… to strengthen our national unity… [this] is the only way out of these difficult times." The president-elect has said he intends to form a coalition government with members from other parties, including secularists, liberals, leftists and Copts.
Morsi's words will clearly be judged by his actions. He will first need to gain the trust of all Egyptians if he is to lead the country away from military rule. If Morsi, and the Egyptian people, succeed in doing so, the president-elect will need to enact various social, political, and significant economic reform to boost the stagnant economy.
Indeed, the Egyptian people – from all political leanings and religious groups – need to find this "national unity," which Morsi has called for, to safeguard the ongoing revolution and to move the country away from military rule. A truly united group of people can never be defeated. The sooner the Egyptian people realise this, the better chance they will have at ending the military's grip on power.
The future is likely to see a power struggle between Morsi and the Brotherhood, against the SCAF. The Muslim Brotherhood is highly unlikely to engage in a direct or violent confrontation with the military, but will instead use its prowess at the height of Egypt's political spectrum to continue with demonstrations, hold possible labour union strikes and conduct negotiations with the military.
At the moment, however, Tahrir Square has been filled with protestors for nearly one week. They are demanding an end to military rule, the handover of power to the civilian elected president and the reinstatement of parliament. Time will tell if and when their demands are met. Until then, the echoes of "down down with military rule" will still be heard.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer's editorial policy. 
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		Wed, 23 May 2012 01:38:11 +0000
				
		
		
		

					An analysis of the Egyptian presidential elections and the rise of a former Muslim Brotherhood member, Abdel Mone’im Aboul-Fotouh.

Egypt is set to hold its first free and fair presidential elections, as the Arab world’s most populous nation seeks to shift away from military rule and to a civilian elected government. Following the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt has been ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), much to the displeasure of the Egyptian public who demand a transfer of power to a leader elected by the ballot box.
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										An analysis of the Egyptian presidential elections and the rise of a former Muslim Brotherhood member, Abdel Mone’im Aboul-Fotouh.

Egypt is set to hold its first free and fair presidential elections, as the Arab world’s most populous nation seeks to shift away from military rule and to a civilian elected government. Following the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt has been ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), much to the displeasure of the Egyptian public who demand a transfer of power to a leader elected by the ballot box.
The Islamist Tide
Egypt has already conducted its first parliamentary elections since the Arab uprisings began. The result saw the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) win the majority of seats: its political branch, the Freedom and Justice Party, won 47% of seats in the Egyptian parliament. The ultraconservative Salafist Al-Nour Party won over 24% while the moderate Islamist party al-Wasat also won a small percentage of the vote.
Due to the electing of Islamic political parties in Egypt, there has been scepticism from secular, liberal, and Coptic Egyptians, who view the rise of the Brotherhood and the Salafists as a sign that Egypt will turn into a theocracy.
Moreover, the victory of Rachid Ghannouchi’s An-Nahda party in Tunisia last year, the appointing of an Islamist prime minister in Morocco, and the significant gains made by the Islamist-tribal coalition in Kuwait have prompted analysts to remark upon the changing political tide in the Middle East and North Africa.
Aboul-Fotouh and the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen
Furthermore, some observers argue that Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) are also part of this shift towards “Islamism” – a label the Turkish prime minister rejects – due to his background and previous imprisonment by the state. Significantly, analysts have held up Erdogan’s Turkey as an example that represents a balance between Islamic conservatism and secularism.
Many observers argue that a relatively unknown candidate (which for some is a cause for scepticism) is capable of creating a balance between Islamism and secularism, and of leading the country into the future: Abdel Mone’im Aboul-Fotouh. A former member of the Ikhwan, he was imprisoned twice by Mubarak and has since joined the race to succeed him at the helm of Egyptian politics.
Once a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Aboul-Fotouh left the political movement last year when the Ikhwan decided not to field a presidential candidate (a decision they later changed). He was one of the first candidates to submit his application to participate in the polls.
The Competitors
Significantly, Aboul-Fotouh – an independent candidate – has been portrayed as a “moderate” Islamist with reformist enthusiasm. His appeal has garnered support from secular liberals and even from the ultraorthodox Salafists.
After 10 of the initial 23 candidates were disqualified, including the Ikhwan’s Khairat el-Shater, Omar Suleyman, and Hazem Abu Isma’il, Aboul-Fotouh emerged as a front-runner along with Amr Moussa, a secular candidate. Moussa, the former foreign minister under Mubarak and the former secretary-general of the Arab League, is now directly competing with Aboul-Fotouh in the polls.
The two favourites participated in the Arab world’s first televised presidential debate that drew millions of viewers from Egypt and beyond. Aboul-Fotouh and Moussa exchanged words in a heated debate over the role of religion in Egyptian society and other issues such as political, social, and economic reform. Moussa accused his rival of being a hard-line Islamist due to his previous Muslim Brotherhood membership, while Aboul-Fotouh retaliated by criticising the former foreign minister for being a member of the Mubarak regime.
"My point of reference is the nation, your point of reference is the Brotherhood," said Moussa, who seeks to appeal to Egyptians concerned about the rise of Islamic political parties. Aboul-Fotouh retorted by stating: "I want to hear one word of opposition you said under Mubarak's regime,” calling out Moussa’s erstwhile support for Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP).
Meanwhile, as a result of el-Shater’s disqualification, the Ikhwan nominated Mohammed Morsi to stand for the election. Morsi is the chairman of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.
El-Shater was disqualified due to his previous conviction and imprisonment under Mubarak’s political crackdown. The disqualification of el-Shater was a significant loss to the Ikhwan. Shadi Hamid, from the Brookings Institute, said: “Morsi was the backup for a reason. El-Shater was the only one among them who looked remotely presidential. It’s a big blow to the Brotherhood.”
Significantly, following the disqualification of Abu Isma’il, a Salafist candidate, the Al-Nour Party decided to back Aboul-Fotouh in a strategic move. To counteract the dominance of the Ikhwan’s Freedom and Justice Party, the Salafists chose to support Aboul-Fotouh to potentially avoid the election of the Brotherhood’s presidential candidate. Indeed, liberals and Coptics fear that the Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to monopolise power by backtracking over its initial decision to not nominate a candidate for the presidency.
Domestic and Foreign Policy

Meanwhile, for many Egyptians, Aboul-Fotouh represents an alternative to the Ikhwan, despite being a former member. Some of his main domestic policies include plans to increase health and education funds, and to strengthen the Egyptian army. His outlook is to boost the economy, something that is in desperate need due to the long-standing stagnant economic growth of the country. Indeed, Egypt needs significant economic, social, and political reform – like the rest of the Arab world.
Some issues which need to be addressed by the new president and his government include creating better job opportunities for graduates and non-graduates, education, affordable housing, adherence to women’s rights, and the protection of minority groups such as the Coptic Christian community. If Aboul-Fotouh is successful in his bid to become Egypt’s president, he would need to address these underlying issues that arguably led to the start of the ongoing revolution.
On the subject of foreign policy, Aboul-Fotouh has taken the stance which most of the candidates have regarding the peace treaty with Israel. He has called for a review of the peace treaty that was signed by late President Anwar el-Sadat in 1979 and maintained by Mubarak ever since.
“I still view the peace treaty as a national security threat to Egypt and it must be revised. It is a treaty that forbids Egypt from exercising full sovereignty in Sinai and allows Israelis to enter Sinai without visas, while they need visas for Cairo,” stated Aboul-Fotouh. The treaty does not allow for Egypt to maintain a military presence in portions of the Sinai Peninsula.
According to Egypt Independent, Aboul-Fotouh said Israel was “a racist state with 200 nuclear warheads”, which he argued was a threat to Egyptian security.
Indeed, whoever is elected president is going to have a significant impact upon the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv. The Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has made various statements regarding the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and views the electing of a possible Islamist president with extreme caution.              
However, regardless of whether Aboul-Fotouh, Moussa, or Morsi win the race, their job will be to move the country away from military rule, to form a new unified government, and to improve the lives and living conditions of 80mn Egyptians. Though it is far from clear who will win the election, one thing is certain:  Egypt needs a new path.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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		Wed, 09 May 2012 19:50:56 +0000
				
		
		
		
		

					A summary of Algeria’s post-colonial history and a brief look at the first legislative elections since the start of the ongoing Arab uprisings.

Background
Algeria, now Africa's largest country since Sudan split, gained its independence in 1962 after a bloody and catastrophic war which cost over 1 million lives and culminated in the end of French colonial rule. The war began in 1954 and ensued for nearly a decade, until the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) rose to power.
The post Algeria: A Break With the Past? appeared first on Fair Observer.
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A summary of Algeria’s post-colonial history and a brief look at the first legislative elections since the start of the ongoing Arab uprisings.
Background
Algeria, now Africa's largest country since Sudan split, gained its independence in 1962 after a bloody and catastrophic war which cost over 1 million lives and culminated in the end of French colonial rule. The war began in 1954 and ensued for nearly a decade, until the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) rose to power.
Following this, Algeria saw its political route move towards a socialist system. The FLN aligned itself with the Soviet Union in the Cold War era and with revolutionary Arab states. Despite the discovery of natural resources such as oil, economic growth has been unable to keep up with the population increase.
The most recent recollection of modern Algerian history focuses on the civil war of the 1990s. Following the victory of the Islamist party, Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), in the local elections of 1990 and the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, the Algerian military annulled the vote. The military staged a coup d’état, forced the president from power, and seized control. The FIS was banned despite popular support.
As a result, Algeria was affected by over a decade of civil war between various armed Islamist factions and the military. The Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) was the largest armed rebel group and eventually broke into smaller factions that fought each other as well as the regime. The war left over 150,000 people dead.
In 1999 an amnesty was issued, following the electing of President Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika, which subsequently meant that rebels began to put down their weapons. Bouteflika also began to enforce a combination of reforms in an attempt to quell the rebellion.
The Arab Uprisings, Islamists and the Legislative Elections
Following the start of the ongoing Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia, non-violent protests reached Algeria by January 2011. While protesting against living conditions, corruption and other socio-economic grievances, four Algerians set themselves alight to emulate the actions of Mohammed Bouazizi.
In an attempt to curtail protests and to stop them from reaching the scale seen in Tunis and Cairo, Bouteflika pledged economic and political reform and ended the 19-year state of emergency law in February 2011. As a result, demonstrations significantly calmed.
Analysts argue that the limited nature of the protests in Algeria, compared to other Arab countries including neighbouring Morocco which continues to see demonstrations by the February 20 Movement, was due to public fear of a return to violence like in the 1990s. The civil war in Libya and the now armed revolt in Syria have led many Algerians to shy away from calling for demonstrations. The involvement of NATO forces in the battle for Libya also resurrected bitter memories of the War of Independence for the Algerian people. Indeed, a significant proportion of Algerians do not want to see any foreign armies on their land in the event of another war.
Meanwhile, with the ascent of the An-Nahda political party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, and the Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD) in Morocco, it is understood by observers that Algerian Islamists may gain a significant amount of seats in the elections on May 10.
However, despite the ban on the FIS, it should be noted that Islamic political parties in Algeria do participate in parliament.
"Algeria is neither Tunisia nor Morocco or Egypt. We have our own political history where Islamism is an essential part of the political landscape and we've seen at least one Islamist political party sharing the power, like the Movement of Society of Peace (MSP)," said Mhand Berkouk, of the Algerian Center for Strategic Researches and Security (CRSS).
The turnout for Thursday’s election is expected to be low with some projections standing at 20%, due to vast proportions of Algerians holding no confidence in the modest reforms that Bouteflika has introduced. It is believed by many that the same corrupt politicians will be the winners on the day and therefore, apathy is rife.  
As a result, Algeria is unlikely to see demonstrations or an intifada (uprising) anytime soon, unlike its Arab brethren from Tunis to Sana’a.  

	 
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		Fri, 10 Feb 2012 19:07:04 +0000
				
		
		
		

					Fair Observer's Abul-Hasanat Siddique discusses the situation which has affected Egypt since the start of the ongoing revolution, and the successes and failures of the SCAF.

The Arab world, and particularly Egypt, has seen the most profound events occur throughout 2011. Following the successful overthrow of Tunisia's Zine El-Abideen Ben Ali, the Egyptian people took to the streets of Cairo and beyond to call for their own change and the end of former President Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule. Egyptians recently celebrated the one-year anniversary of the revolution that began on January 25, when demonstrators gathered in focal points across the country including Tahrir Square in Cairo. Indeed, the "celebrations" were arguably not celebrations but rather demonstrations against the current military rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
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										Fair Observer's Abul-Hasanat Siddique discusses the situation which has affected Egypt since the start of the ongoing revolution, and the successes and failures of the SCAF.

The Arab world, and particularly Egypt, has seen the most profound events occur throughout 2011. Following the successful overthrow of Tunisia's Zine El-Abideen Ben Ali, the Egyptian people took to the streets of Cairo and beyond to call for their own change and the end of former President Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule. Egyptians recently celebrated the one-year anniversary of the revolution that began on January 25, when demonstrators gathered in focal points across the country including Tahrir Square in Cairo. Indeed, the "celebrations" were arguably not celebrations but rather demonstrations against the current military rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
The events which ensued for 18 days in Egypt and culminated in the downfall of Mubarak occurred for various reasons. The situation will undoubtedly be discussed and analysed for decades to come, while the outcome of the current situation will affect future generations as it has effectively changed the way Egyptian society perceives the state. The fear of reprisal for protesting against the state has not hindered many Egyptians, and indeed many Arabs across the region, in this ongoing revolution.
The political upheaval and unrest throughout the Arab world share similar explanations for their occurrence. Although each country involved in the Arab uprisings is individual in its core, significant portions of the Arab region have seen – and continue to see – economic, social and political problems which propelled populations to rise up and call for reform.
It is widely argued that while most parts of the world evolved from rural-based economies to industrial and communication-led ones, the Arab region has seen its economy remain largely stagnant.  As a result of this, investment in the region has largely applied to oil and gas industries. Significantly, Egypt and other countries involved in the uprisings have large proportions of university-educated youth who after seeing years of economic gloom and high unemployment, felt dissatisfied with their future prospects under the current system. The Egyptian working class has also been affected by growing wealth-gaps.
Furthermore, the Mubarak regime was complicit in corruption, along with state officials and the elite. Indeed, there was clear fraud conducted at various elections including the parliamentary votes of 2010, which saw a landslide victory for Mubarak's National Democratic Party. The actions of the former president and his family have led for him to be tried for corruption and for ordering the shooting of protestors during last year's demonstrations.            
Likewise, the significant limiting of freedom of speech (especially to criticise the state) and mass human rights abuses propelled the mainly peaceful and secular youth (and labour union strikers) to rise up in protest. Indeed, there was a large presence of Islamists participating in the Egyptian uprising, however, they purposely downplayed their involvement to avoid claims that the upheaval was an Islamist-led revolt.  
Though Mubarak stepped down as president on February 11, 2011, he delegated power to the SCAF, the military council led by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi. Consequently, there is a significant proportion of Egyptians calling for the immediate end of military rule and the implementation of a transitional civilian government. Since Mubarak was a member of the SCAF, many see the policies which the military have employed since early 2011 to be a mere reflection of the former president's. Despite the SCAF stating that it will conduct presidential elections in the summer and hand over power to a civilian elected leader, protestors are sceptical over whether the military council will stand by its promise or seek to control the process and possibly seize power.    
The demonstrators which oppose the SCAF rule have made their voices heard on various occasions, particularly before the start of the parliamentary elections in November 2011, and have been met with violent force from the military and security services for doing so. While the SCAF have made some changes — for example: immediately dissolving parliament, reforming the electoral process by allowing for full judicial oversight of elections, limiting the presidential term in office, and arresting and trying former regime officials including Mubarak — demonstrators continue to have a justified grievance against the ongoing military rule.
Some of the many points which concern the Egyptian anti-military protestors include: the contentious drafting of a new constitution, the delays and complicated processes which have surrounded the ongoing parliamentary and the expected presidential elections in the summer (which was only brought forward due to political unrest), and the much debated emergency law.
Tantawi has stated that the emergency law, which has been in place since the assassination of former President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, would be partially lifted on January 25. However, he added that the law would still apply in situations of "thuggery", leading activists and analysts to see the relaxing of the state of emergency as an appeasement attempt, similar to those by Mubarak during the 18-day uprising. It is widely believed the military will use Tantawi's vague words to justify the use of force against demonstrators it deems to be "thugs".
The SCAF has also fallen short of protestor demands on other areas including its failure to hold to account those responsible for the killing of over 800 protestors and the injuring of thousands. Despite one low-ranking police officer being convicted for his role in the violence early last year, there has been no accountability for other police and security forces who were involved in the killings, while there has also been no punishment for the violence committed by the military following the departure of Mubarak. Moreover, the SCAF has failed to reform Egypt's security forces and the military, and has not released political prisoners. Over 12,000 prisoners have been tried in military courts since January 2011, surpassing the number tried during Mubarak’s 30-year rule.      
At present, Egypt has a new People's Assembly (lower house) in parliament that is dominated by Islamist parties including the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, the ultra-conservative An-Nour Party and the moderate-Islamist Al-Wasat Party. A coalition government is expected to be formed between the Freedom and Justice Party and the secular Al-Wafd Party, which only won a minority of parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, the elections for the upper house of parliament are still ongoing.
Whether or not the SCAF uphold their promise to conduct free and fair presidential elections in the summer and relinquish power to a civilian elected leader, the ongoing demonstrations since Mubarak’s resignation, and the call from activists for a day of civil disobedience on February 11 show that the Egyptian revolution is not over. The people still want the downfall of the regime.



View our Egypt photo feature 
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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		Fri, 10 Feb 2012 19:07:04 +0000
				
		
		
		

					A summary of the events which led to and which have followed the downfall of Hosni Mubarak as the president of Egypt. 

The situation in Egypt surrounding the ongoing revolution which began in January 2011, has been a significant feature of news broadcasters across the world. The country which is seen as an important geopolitical nation and is considered the 'heart of the Arab world', disposed of its longstanding former president, Hosni Mubarak. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak was forced to resign from office given widespread protests against his rule. Consequently, he handed over power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), led by Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi.
The post Egypt: One Year After Mubarak appeared first on Fair Observer.
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										A summary of the events which led to and which have followed the downfall of Hosni Mubarak as the president of Egypt. 

The situation in Egypt surrounding the ongoing revolution which began in January 2011, has been a significant feature of news broadcasters across the world. The country which is seen as an important geopolitical nation and is considered the 'heart of the Arab world', disposed of its longstanding former president, Hosni Mubarak. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak was forced to resign from office given widespread protests against his rule. Consequently, he handed over power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), led by Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi.
The events which led to Mubarak's downfall during the 18-day uprising were characterised by mainly peaceful protests across Egypt and particularly at the famous Tahrir Square in Cairo. Nationwide labour union strikes effectively paralysed the country, which were significantly more influential in toppling the regime than the actual demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and elsewhere. The protests saw both secularists and Islamists, men and women, and Muslims and Christians galvanise and stand united in their quest to topple one of the Arab world's longest serving dictators.
Similar to the shabab (youth) in other parts of the Arab world, the youth in Egypt were disappointed with their future prospects in a country rife with corruption, growing wealth gaps, mass unemployment and human rights abuses. Notably, these are only some of the reasons why the university-educated and tech-savvy youth organised vast proportions of Egyptians to demonstrate following the downfall of Tunisia's former dictator, Zine El-Abideen Ben Ali.
Since the toppling of Mubarak, the mainly secular youth have continued to demonstrate on a regular basis against the rule of the SCAF, and have called for an end to military rule and the transfer of power to a civilian-led government. Prior to the start of the ongoing parliamentary elections in November 2011, thousands of protestors returned to Tahrir Square to call for the resignation of Tantawi. As a result, protestors were met with violent force by the military and security forces as the brutal crackdown on demonstrators was televised worldwide. The symbolic image of the situation was epitomised by the treatment of a young woman who was severely beaten by soldiers and had her abaya (an Islamic female over-garment) pulled off to reveal her bra.
Despite assertions made by the council that they will hold free and fair elections and relinquish power to a civilian elected president in the summer, demonstrators remain sceptical of the SCAF.
Meanwhile, Egypt has elected a new lower house of parliament with an overwhelming victory for Islamic or Islamist parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of the seats and the religiously conservative Salafist An-Nour Party won 24%. Al-Wasat, a moderate Islamic party, won a small percentage of seats as well.  
Whichever direction the newly elected parliament takes the country towards, the chants of Ash-sha'ab yureed isqat an-nidham (the people want the downfall of the regime) and irhal (leave) will surely be heard until the military relinquishes power.
View our Egypt photo feature 
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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		Sun, 18 Dec 2011 10:30:00 +0000
				
		
		
		
		

					
A reflection on the events which triggered the ongoing Arab Uprisings and an outline of what to look for in 2012.

The post One Year Later: A Look Back at the Arab Uprisings appeared first on Fair Observer.
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A reflection on the events which triggered the ongoing Arab Uprisings and an outline of what to look for in 2012.

This weekend marked the one year anniversary since Mohammed Bouazizi, a young street vendor, set himself alight on the streets of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. The events which ensued after this were surely unpredictable, as the streets of the Arab world erupted in anti-government protests. The chants of Ash-sha'ab yureed isqat an-nidham (“the people want the downfall of the regime”) have become a symbolic call for protestors in the hunt for reform, freedom, and democracy from the Maghreb to the depths of the Arabian Gulf.

The Lighter Fluid for Revolution

The story of Bouazizi's life epitomises a significant amount of working class people in the Arab world and their daily struggles. His father had passed away when he was an infant, which led him to become the family breadwinner and begin selling fruits and vegetables at the age of ten.

The late 26-year old, who died of his injuries in January 2011, sacrificed his own education to pay for his sister's university tuition. Bouazizi’s mother, Mannoubia, stated that "He didn't expect to study, because we didn't have the money." Instead he worked until 3am each day, with a few hours sleep to provide for his mother and sisters.

However, due to the corruption of state institutions, Bouazizi was frequently harassed by officials, as were many other Tunisians on a daily basis. Yasmine Ryan stated, "Police would confiscate his scales and his produce, or fine him for running a stall without a permit." On December 17, 2010, he had his livelihood confiscated, was publically humiliated and slapped by a female municipal officer, and was refused entry to the government building in order to retrieve his borrowed scales and produce. This was surely the tipping point for Bouazizi, as he covered himself in lighter fluid and set himself ablaze.

The Arab Intifada

Following this, the residents of Sidi Bouzid began to rise in protest against the treatment of Bouazizi. The protests, and consequently riots and labour union strikes which arose, soon spread across the nation. The Tunisian people (along with most protestors in the Arab world) initially began calling for reforms including better living conditions, an end to corruption, police brutality and high unemployment, and a call for greater freedom of expression.  However, due to the violent crackdown on protestors, calls began to emerge for the fall of Zine El-Abideen Ben Ali's longstanding autocratic rule.  On January 14, 2011, the former president fled Tunisia to seek exile in Saudi Arabia with members of his family.

The overthrow of Ben Ali was seen as a surprising shock in the Arab world, Europe, and the United States. However, the events which followed January 14 were perhaps even more shocking. The protests which had engulfed the small nation in the Maghreb soon spread to Egypt, which saw 18 days of nationwide demonstrations and union strikes which crippled the country. Tahrir Square in Cairo became a symbolic focal point of peaceful demonstrations during February, as an estimated few million people of different religions, political affiliations and genders galvanised together to call for the end of former President Hosni Mubarak's 30 year rule.

As a result of the successful overthrow of two longstanding Arab dictators, the people of Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria all rose in opposition to their own autocratic leaders. In addition, various other countries in the region - such as Morocco, Jordan, Algeria and Saudi Arabia - saw protests emerge calling for democratic reform. Whilst some of the latter countries have attempted to appease protestor demands through rather modest changes, the former group of nations have seen a civil war, brutal and violent crackdowns, and potentially another civil war.

Fighters of the Libyan National Transitional Council ended Muammar Qaddafi's 42-year rule over the North African country, after he was killed in October following a NATO-backed civil war. Meanwhile, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has recently agreed to step down following the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, which means he will cede power in exchange for immunity from prosecution. However, protestors in Yemen remain unhappy with the initiative as they still demand that Saleh stands trial for crimes committed during his rule, including the violent crackdown on protestors which has left hundreds dead since the uprising began. Demonstrators in Bahrain, who called for reforms in the small Gulf State, saw their uprising brutally crushed under a government crackdown on protestors situated in the Pearl roundabout.

Currently, Syria has seen over 5,000 people killed in the ongoing uprising, which calls for the end of Bashar Al Assad's and the Baathist regime's autocratic rule, which began with his father Hafez who enacted his own brutal crackdown on an uprising in 1982, killing tens of thousands. The situation has recently seen signs of a civil war with mass army defectors forming the Free Syrian Army.

What Will 2012 Bring?

Meanwhile, with a successful Constituent Assembly election in Tunisia conducted in October, along with the ongoing parliamentary elections in Egypt (both of which have seen significant victories for Islamist parties), 2012 should promise to be another 'eventful' year in the Arab world.

The multiple focuses will surely fall upon the proposed Tunisian parliamentary elections towards the end of the year, the outcome of Egypt's parliamentary and expected presidential votes, the Libyan elections for a constituent assembly, the Yemeni presidential race, and the outcome of the Syrian uprising. Indeed, the Palestinian territories are also set to hold elections, something which promises to have Israeli and American eyes fixed upon.   

Whilst some Arab nations - such as Morocco and Jordan - have made few concessions to try appease protestor demands, questions remain over whether 2012 will see further uprisings across the region or the greater Muslim world. It is clear to argue that the vast majority, if not all, analysts failed to predict the ongoing revolutions from Tunisia to Yemen. Marwan Bishara, the senior political analyst of Al Jazeera English, rightly pointed out in a panel debate and discussion at the London School of Economics that revolutions are unpredictable, that is why they are called revolutions.

Therefore, who is to argue that the following year will not see further political upheaval, especially considering that the current situation would have been deemed 'unthinkable' on December 16, 2010? As Robert Fisk argues, the Arab people are now fearless of standing up against their autocratic rulers and therefore, the so called 'Arab Spring' will not be a phenomenon restricted to one year.

Iyad el-Baghdadi, the compiler of the 'Arab Tyrant's Manual', notably stated in The Guardian: "The Arab world was considered a stagnant pond of retardation and tyranny, inhabited by what appeared to be a complacent populace toiling fatalistically under the yoke of their dictators. Most observers thought this status quo to be stable, if not permanent. What's worst, many Arabs thought so too. Boy, look at us now."    

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post One Year Later: A Look Back at the Arab Uprisings appeared first on Fair Observer.
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		Sun, 23 Oct 2011 20:56:40 +0000
				
		
		
		
		

					An insight into the first democratic election to take place in Tunisia since Ben Ali’s exile, and the prospects of the Al-Nahda Islamic political party.

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										An insight into the first democratic election to take place in Tunisia since Ben Ali’s exile, and the prospects of the Al-Nahda Islamic political party.

The ongoing Arab uprisings of 2011 arguably started when the young street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself alight – on December 17, 2010 – after feeling completely demoralised following the confiscation of his livelihood, harassment, and humiliation by a female municipal officer, who publically slapped him across the face on the streets of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia.  Since then, mass mobilisation developed, spread and continues across the Arab world. 
As a result of the uprisings, the former Tunisian President Zine El-Abideen Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia in exile at the behest of the ruling monarch, the former Egyptian President Husni Mobarak has been placed on trial for crimes committed during the 18-day demonstration in Tahrir Square and the rest of Egypt, and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, the controversial former leader of Libya, has recently been killed by fighters of the National Transitional Council in his birth place of Sirte following a NATO- backed civil war.  The people of Yemen and Syria continue to protest against the repressive regimes of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Bashar Al-Assad, with the symbolic chants of “Ash-sha’ab yureed isqat an-nidham” (translation: the people want the downfall of the regime) echoing throughout the respective countries.
The Vote for the Constituent Assembly
Meanwhile, Tunisia will hold its first free and fair democratic elections on October 23rd..  Delegates from the European Union have been sent to the country in order to monitor the process for its fairness and precision, ensuring a representative vote is conducted. 
The Tunisian people are set to elect an assembly, which will be given the task of drafting a new constitution for the North African country.  An interim government was formed on March 3, led by Fouad Mebazaa and the current Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, following the removal of most ministers from Ben Ali’s regime.  The transitional government announced that the election for a Constituent Assembly would take place in October, following the postponement of an earlier date set for July 24th.
The elected Constituent Assembly has a mandate for one year, whilst Mebazaa, Essebsi and the current interim government are expected to step down following the vote.  It will be the task of the assembly to form a new government until the end of the assembly agreement next year.  According to a pact signed by 12 political parties in September – which outlined the formation of an assembly to rewrite the constitution and the proposed new interim government – Tunisians will be permitted to elect a new government themselves following the end of the assembly mandate in the latter stages of 2012.
The assembly will consist of 217 elected members, who will debate and decide on a new constitution for the country.  Since the overthrow of Ben Ali, 81 new political parties have been formed to take part in the election along with a vast number of independent candidates. 
The return of Ghannouchi and Al-Nahda
It is thought that the assembly will decide on the role of religion in the political spectrum of the country.  The current constitution, which was devised under the authoritarian regime of the first president after French colonial rule, Habib Bourghiba, defines Tunisia as a secular Muslim state.  However, some of the population are sceptical of electing or voting for an Islamic political party for fears of changing the secular nature of the country into a theocracy. 
Clashes have particularly been seen recently between Salafist and secular protestors and the police over the screening of an animated film called Persepolis.  The film depicts an image of Allah (God), which is forbidden in Islam, as Islamists protested against its screening whilst secularists demonstrated in favour of it, with the backdrop of freedom of speech.  Islamist protestors also clashed with police over the ban on wearing the niqab (full-face veil) in universities after a female student was refused entry.
Despite this, the Al-Nahda Islamic political party formed by Rachid Ghannouchi, who was previously in exile for 20 years in the United Kingdom, is seen as a moderate voice in Tunisia, similar to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AK Party in Turkey.  It is believed that the Islamic or ‘Islamist’ party is the favourite to win a majority at the polls, with a projected 25% of voter support.  However, with the vast number of political parties and independent candidates taking part, the election results may see the possibility of having no clear majority winner.   
The Al-Nahda (meaning renaissance) party, which was banned and brutally repressed under the rule of Ben Ali, aims to challenge the western stereotype of ‘Islamism’ with its moderate voice, pro-democratic nature and pro-women’s rights view.
In a recent article in the British newspaper, the Guardian, Ghannouchi wrote: “We have long advocated democracy within the mainstream trend of political Islam, which we feel is the best system that protects against injustice and authoritarianism. In addition, it provides institutions and mechanisms to guarantee personal and public liberties, most importantly the peaceful transfer of power through the mechanism of elections, respect of the popular will, protection of the rights of women, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, press and media freedom and protection of minority rights. All these are in no way contradictory with Islam, but reflect the Islamic principles of consultation, justice and accountability as we understand them.”
The view of the Al-Nahda party contradicts the popular Western view of Islamist groups, which are claimed to be ‘hostile’ towards non-Muslims (albeit in the case of Al-Shabab in Somalia this holds a level of validity particularly of late).  This opinion has also advocated the idea that democracy and Islam are not compatible by limiting the freedom of expression amongst the population.  However, Ghannouchi states: “God says in the Qur'an that "There is no compulsion in religion"; therefore we believe that neither the state nor any social actor has the right to interfere in society in order to impose a certain lifestyle, belief or idea. These should be matters of free personal choice.” 
Ghannouchi also recently stated in an interview with Al Jazeera: “We are against the imposition of the headscarf in the name of Islam and we are against the banning of the headscarf in the name of secularism or modernity.”  This view may help ease the tension between Salafists and secularists, following the recent unrest over the ban of the niqab in universities.  Perhaps the French President Nicolas Sarkozy should actually take tips from Ghannouchi over the meaning of ‘freedom of expression’ to wear what one wishes in France, a ‘democratic’ European state. 
If Al-Nahda wins a majority in the Constituent Assembly elections this month and the proposed 2012 elections, it remains to be seen how they would run the state and whether the promises made by Ghannouchi turn into true action. Thus said, the mere involvement of the previously banned Islamic political party in the election process in Tunisia shows how far this small country in the Maghreb has come since December 17, 2010.
However, despite the symbolic return of Ghannouchi and Al-Nahda in a ‘new’ Tunisia, human rights groups still complain of abuses by Ben Ali sympathisers in the corrupted judicial system and the police.  Imene Triki, a rights activist, said: “We are overwhelmed with cases of human rights abuses. You wouldn't believe there had been a revolution.  Torture is the way things are done, it's systematic. They have not changed their practices at all.”  Claims of blogger activist arrests built on false charges and people accused of being “Salafists”, indicate that this revolution is far from over.
In light of these claims, perhaps then Ghannouchi is clearly right by stating: “Tunisia needs a new political system, [and] a decisive break with the past.”  It will be up to the Tunisian people to choose which political system is the right one for them, starting today.          
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		Thu, 22 Sep 2011 05:08:35 +0000
				
		
		
		

					An analysis of the Palestinian bid for recogntion at the United Nations.

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										An analysis of the Palestinian bid for recogntion at the United Nations.

The United Nations is due to begin its annual General Assembly debate on September 21 in New York, whilst the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), led by chairman Mahmoud Abbas, is set to request for international recognition of the state of Palestine based on the 1967 borders, as well as  full membership at the UN. In light of the Arab spring, the PLO has called upon the Palestinian people to demonstrate peacefully in the occupied territories, and to show solidarity with the UN recognition campaign.
However, despite the efforts which the Palestinians have shown over the past year in order to gain support worldwide, the United States and Israel have threatened Mr. Abbas not to approach the UN. Both nations argue that peace should be concluded via negotiations and agreed land swaps with Israel. 
The previous round of peace talks in 2010 collapsed following the refusal of Israeli officials to extend the expired moratorium on building illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, despite Washington’s efforts to reignite negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  The peace process was left in further tatters after the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, laid out various pre-conditions at the White House, the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) meeting, and in front of Congress.   
Veto at the Security Council
Mr. Abbas, who will be acting as chairman of the PLO and not the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the General Assembly, stated on September 16: “We are going to the Security Council.  We need full membership in the United Nations… we need a state, and we need a seat at the UN.”  The Palestinian leader is set to submit a formal request for state recognition upon the 1967 borders, which includes East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.  
The US has confirmed they will veto any approach by the Palestinians at the Security Council.  President Barack Obama said in regards to the proposed bid: “If this came to the Security Council we would object very strongly, precisely because we think it would be counterproductive. We don't think that it would actually lead to the outcome that we want, which is a two-state solution.  What we've said is that going to the UN is a distraction, [it] does not solve the problem.  This issue is only gonna be resolved by Israelis and Palestinians agreeing to something.”
Mr. Obama and the US administration are adamant that peace is only attainable via talks between the Israelis and Palestinians, with mutual land swaps.  The US President is reluctant to isolate Israel in the international community, by affirming his support at the UN Security Council for a Palestinian state, due to the “special bond” between the nations.  He sees the statehood bid as not changing the ongoing dispute over borders, Israeli occupation, settlements and effectively the blockade of Gaza, which he argues is only solvable through negotiations.    
However, the Palestinians clearly no longer see peace talks as being worthwhile due to their ineffectiveness over the previous 20 years and the stalemate in 2010.  Following Mr. Netanyahu’s outlining of pre-conditions in May, Saeb Erekat the Palestinian chief negotiator, said: “I don’t think we can talk about a peace process with a man who says Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel, undivided, and he does not want a single [Palestinian] refugee to go back.  What is left to negotiate?”  Mr. Abbas recently stated in Ramallah: “We have been willing to take part in serious negotiations.”  The ‘Palestine Papers’, obtained by Al Jazeera, clearly highlighted the lengths the Palestinians were willing to go in order to establish a state by offering Israel most of East Jerusalem, concessions on the right of return for refugees and the annexation of large portions of the West Bank, in return for unused land around Gaza.  The Palestinian leader added: “But we received nothing from the Israeli government except wasting time and imposing facts on the ground.” 
The Palestinians see the UN recognition bid as a last attempt to obtain statehood (and effectively the two state-solution which the US promotes) by asking the world to recognise them.   
The US pro-Israeli lobby at Congress and AIPAC clearly outlined their opposition to the Palestinian’s UN bid when Mr. Netanyahu held multiple conferences in Washington earlier this year.  The Israeli Prime Minister thwarted Mr. Obama’s efforts to state that negotiations should be based on the 1967 borders, by labelling them as “indefensible”.  Mr. Obama was later forced to clarify his statements at the AIPAC meeting, whilst Congress praised Mr. Netanyahu for outlining his multiple pre-conditions to peace talks with the Palestinians.  Mr. Obama is unwilling to go against the wishes of the US pro-Israeli lobby and recognise Palestine due to the upcoming presidential elections.  The support of Congress is imperative for the US president to win re-election in 2012.
Meanwhile, a veto by the US a permanent member of the Security Council would be detrimental to the Palestinian campaign for full membership at the UN General Assembly. 
In order for the proposed recognition bid to be put forth to the General Assembly, approval would initially be required by the 15-member Security Council.  For the request to be passed, nine out of fifteen votes would be required with no veto from any of the permanent members, which include the US.  Should the US veto the Palestinian statehood bid at the Security Council, the General Assembly would be unable to vote on the proposal.  
The PLO may instead decide to present a resolution directly to the General Assembly in order to be upgraded to non-member observer state, on par with the Vatican, if the Security Council proposal is vetoed.  This would require gaining at least 129 votes, whilst at the moment 122 countries recognise Palestine.  The Palestinians are confident of obtaining approximately 150 votes at the General Assembly.  The PLO currently holds “entity” status at the UN.
Mr. Abbas is expected to address the General Assembly on September 23, before submitting the formal request to the UN. 
Public support
It is believed the UK and France, as permanent Security Council members, may choose to follow the US lead and veto the Palestinian bid.  However, neither nation has confirmed its decision.  Despite this, the UK and France may choose to instead vote in favour of Palestine gaining non-member observer status at the UN General Assembly, should the bid be presented to them. 
The European Union has not currently reached a consensus over how it will vote at the General Assembly.  The EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, said recently: "There is no resolution on the table yet, so there is no position.  What we're very clear about from the European Union is that the way forward is negotiations.”    
It is understood that Germany, the Netherlands, and others may vote against the statehood bid.  However Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, recently said in regards to the Palestinian move: “I am not going to disclose today our voting intentions, whatever they may be.  We are going to use the days that remain to perhaps achieve a few millimetres of movement.”             
Despite the view of the governments in the UK, France and Germany, public support for a Palestinian state in these countries are high, according to a poll conducted by YouGov and Avaaz.  The published poll revealed that support for the Palestinian people to have their own state stands at: 71% in the UK, 82% in France, and 86% in Germany. 
"The prime minister [David Cameron] has a clear choice: stand with the British public and 120 other nations to support a Palestinian state and a new path to peace, or side with the US government, which continues to push for a failed status quo,” noted Ricken Patel of Avaaz. 
The public view of the British government in the UK during the era of former Prime Minister Tony Blair was that the Labour party was clearly aligned with the George W. Bush administration.  Mr. Blair’s collaboration with the US in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 against the wishes of the British public led to a substantial lost of parliamentary seats in 2010.  Should Mr. Cameron and the coalition government back the statehood bid, it would be seen by analysts and the public as a break from the previous government’s close foreign policy with the US.  
The days after
Meanwhile, amidst calls and threats from the US, EU and Israel for the Palestinians to stop the UN bid, Mr. Abbas has reiterated the plan for statehood upon the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital:  “Whatever the pressures, we’re going to the UN to submit our application for the membership.  We know that many countries do not agree with us, do not like this idea, but we will go there.” 
If Palestine obtains full membership, it would allow it greater opportunities to seek international legal action against the Israeli occupation and the illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and effectively the blockade of Gaza.  Mr. Abbas has claimed that statehood for the Palestinians would give them a better chance to diplomatically fight the occupation: "It means we will be a state under occupation. Israel now says [East Jerusalem and the West Bank] is a disputed area and they can build settlements everywhere. They do not recognise that this is Palestinian territory.  When we are a state … we will negotiate accordingly with the Israelis, of course with the support of the UN.”  The PLO chairman stated recently in Ramallah: “We’re not going there [to the United Nations] to become independent.  We will come back to negotiate the other issues.” 
Analysts argue that full membership at the UN would give the Palestinians the possibility to take Israel to the international criminal court.  In regards to the prospect, Mr. Abbas stated: "You are obliged to go [to the ICC] because somebody takes your rights, attacks you, or whatever it is.  We don't want to go to the ICC for nothing.  Tell the Israelis not to attack the Palestinians, and we will not go there. When you see the settlers every day burning mosques, cutting [down] trees – who prevents them?" 
However, since the Security Council vote to become a full member is likely to be blocked by the expected US veto, the Palestinians may have to settle for a non-member observer status.  Whilst this would mean an upgraded place at the UN for Palestine and allow them to join more UN bodies, it remains to be seen what this position would actually change.
Questions remain about what will happen in the days after the UN recognition bid at the Security Council and more importantly the General Assembly.  As Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, an international relations specialist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, clearly puts it: “The big question is the day after.  The settlements will still be there.  The Israeli Army will still be there.”
Mohammed Shtayyeh, a senior member of the PLO, acknowledged that a declaration of Palestinian statehood would not change the occupation and settlement.  He notes: “Things on the ground are not going to be different.  The difference will happen on the political level. Palestinians will join UN institutions… and the Palestinian territories will no longer be considered 'disputed lands' but occupied lands." 
There has been a recent sense of mounting fear, particularly amongst the western media, that a third intifada could occur following the UN vote, which is reflected in the possibility that violence may develop between Palestinians and Jewish settlers.  The Israeli newspaper Haaretz stated recently that the Israeli army is planning to distribute tear gas and stun grenades to settlers in the occupied West Bank to counteract violent protests after the UN proposal. 
Yet, even if there is another intifada, it is possible that such an uprising could possibly remain peaceful, as was the case in Cairo’s Tahrir Square during the February 2011 revolution.  However, even peaceful protests may create a complicated situation for Israeli forces.  According to a US cable released by Wikileaks, Avi Mizrachi, the head of Israel’s central command, told US officials that the Israeli army would handle West Bank demonstrations by deploying trucks “with ‘dirty water’ to break up protests, even if they are not violent.”  Dirty water is in regards to “chemically treated” water that resembles the “effects of skunk spray”.  Likewise, Amos Gilad, Israel's director of policy and political-military affairs, said in the cable: “We don't do Gandhi very well." 
Avigdor Lieberman, the outspoken Israeli foreign minister, said in regards to the Palestinian UN bid: “A move like that will be a violation of all the agreements that were signed until today.  Israel will no longer be committed to the agreements signed with the Palestinians in the past 18 years.”  The agreements which Lieberman referred to were the Oslo accords in 1993, which created and permitted the PA to control small portions of the West Bank and Gaza.  Legal analysts have argued that the UN bid may result in the PA losing the right to govern the small portions of the West Bank they currently have some authority over.  Meanwhile, other threats made by Israeli ministers include the annexing of West Bank settlements and the withholding of tax revenues, collected by Israel for the Palestinians.
Arab and Muslim response to a US veto
It has also been recently claimed by a senior US consul general in Jerusalem that the US may cut its aid to the Palestinians, should it pursue the UN campaign.  During a meeting with Erekat, Daniel Rubinstein is believed to have said: “In case the Palestinian Authority [and the PLO] seeks to upgrade its position at the UN through the General Assembly, the US Congress will take punitive measures against it, including a cut in US aid.”  The US state department denied this.  Mr. Abbas said in response: “We think the US is an honest broker. If they cut their aid to us, then it will be a different situation.”  The amount of aid the Palestinians receive from the US is currently $550m annually.  
Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, noted in an article published in June by the Washington Post that: “In September, the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] will use its considerable diplomatic might to support the Palestinians in their quest for international recognition. American leaders have long called Israel an 'indispensable' ally.”  Al-Faisal, an outspoken critic of Israel and the US support for them, added: “They will soon learn that there are other players in the region – not least the Arab street – who are as, if not more, 'indispensable'. The game of favoritism toward Israel has not proven wise for Washington, and soon it will be shown to be an even greater folly.”
The foreign policy analyst MJ Rosenberg argues that should the US congress cut its substantial aid to the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia may decide to use its diplomatic prowess in the Arab and Muslim world to help fill the loss of funds.  Palestinian officials have also made similar assertions that Arab states would assist with any shortfall of capital.    
Meanwhile, al-Faisal has since warned the Americans that a veto at the Security Council would end the special bond between the two nations, and would be even more detrimental to the Arab and Muslim world’s opinion of the US.
“The United States must support the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations this month or risk losing the little credibility it has in the Arab world.  If it does not, American influence will decline further, Israeli security will be undermined, and Iran will be empowered, increasing the chances of another war in the region,” noted al-Faisal in his article published in the New York Times.
If Mr. Obama decides to back the Palestinian bid for recognition at the Security Council, it would represent a clear break from the current and previous US administration’s staunch support for Israel.  Likewise, it would almost certainly improve the support for Mr. Obama and the US in the Muslim world, which spiked greatly after his election but has diminished since.
Despite the initial optimism after Mr. Obama’s election particularly when he delivered the Cairo 2009 speech, the overall view of the United States in the Arab and Muslim world has since dropped due to ongoing wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and drone attacks against the tribal region of Pakistan, along with the nation’s overall support and funding for Israel.  The popularity of the US in the revolting Arab nations of Tunisia, Egypt Libya, Yemen and Syria has arguably fallen further due to the support the Americans gave to disposed dictators like Husni Mobarak and the ongoing backing of the ruling al-Khalifah family in Bahrain.  John V. Whitbeck, an international lawyer who advised the Palestinian negotiating team in peace talks with Israel, stated: “An American veto would constitute a shotgun blast in both of its own feet, further isolating the US from the rest of the world and outraging the already agitated and unstable Arab and Muslim worlds (notably Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey).” 
If the US vetoes the Palestinian bid, al-Faisal argues: “Saudi Arabia would no longer be able to co-operate with America in the same way it historically has.  With most of the Arab world in upheaval, the "special relationship" between Saudi Arabia and the United States would increasingly be seen as toxic by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, who demand justice for the Palestinian people.” A breakdown in diplomacy between the US and Saudi Arabian government is surely not Mr. Obama’s aim. 
Likewise, a veto from the Americans may possibly ignite anti-US and Israel demonstrations on a mass-scale in the Arab and Muslim world.  Notably, recent anti-Israeli protests and riots have been seen in Cairo (and Amman) causing Egyptian commandos to conduct an emergency evacuation of Israeli embassy staff.
In the meantime, amidst all the diplomacy surrounding the Palestinian statehood bid at the UN, the question of whether the world decides to stand up and recognise the state of Palestine still remains.
The post Palestine: Time for Recognition? appeared first on Fair Observer.
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		https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/salamshalom-process/
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		Tue, 26 Jul 2011 19:40:31 +0000
				
		
		
		

					The stalling of peace talks, the unity pact between Hamas and Fatah and the conditions laid out by Netanyahu in Washington DC has left the Palestinian Authority with one main choice, to seek recognition of a state based upon the 1967 borders at the United Nations in September.  However, the US veto option will be significant.  

The post The ‘Salam/Shalom’ Process appeared first on Fair Observer.
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										The stalling of peace talks, the unity pact between Hamas and Fatah and the conditions laid out by Netanyahu in Washington DC has left the Palestinian Authority with one main choice, to seek recognition of a state based upon the 1967 borders at the United Nations in September.  However, the US veto option will be significant.  

The Arab Uprisings have seen mass mobilisation – amongst the young and the old, men and women, and Muslims and Christian – develop from the Maghreb to the Gulf, calling for the downfall of dictatorships. This follows a rising demand for political reform and democracy since December 2010.  Autocratic regimes have been forced from power by mainly peaceful protestors – Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Egypt’s Husni Mobarak – whilst other Arab leaders are attempting to cling on to the remaining power they have, even if this has meant precipitating a civil war.  The word irhal (leave in Arabic) has echoed from Tunis to Sana’a since.
Israel, the PA and Hamas at the Negotiating Table?
In the Palestinian territories, protests had started in March demanding an end to the political division and instead calling for unity between the governing factions in the West Bank and blockaded Gaza.  Since then Hamas, the armed Islamist rulers of Gaza, has formed a preliminary unity pact alongside Fatah and other factions.  Elections are expected to be conducted in the coming September.
The unity deal has, for some, come as a surprise.  However, since the ousting of Mobarak, the transitional military government of Egypt has sought to play a new mediating role between Palestinian factions – this was the catalyst of unification.  Nabil el-Araby, the former Egyptian foreign minister, had been particularly vocal in his opposition to decisions of the past National Democratic Party government and its policies towards participating in the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza since 2007.  El-Araby labelled the closing of Gaza a “disgrace”.  Subsequently, the Rafah border crossing from Egypt to the Palestinian territory was partially opened on May 28.
Before the unity pact was signed, Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), had stated that elections would be held in September – Hamas refused to accept this.  However, since then, Syria – where Hamas officials are based – has seen a large uprising against the President Bashar al-Assad.  The Syrian President has close diplomatic relations with Hamas officials, including the Hamas leader Khaled Mesha’al who is exiled in Syria.  It has been argued that Hamas may have sought reconciliation with Fatah as a result of the uncertainty surrounding Damascus of late.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, had previously advanced the disunity amongst the Palestinians as a reason not to negotiate but he has now stated that he will not participate in peace talks even if the Palestinian government included Hamas.
However, despite Netanyahu’s stance that he will not negotiate with a “terrorist group” which does not recognise Israel’s right to exist and which “calls for the destruction” of the state — verbally and in their charter — he has failed to identify the alternative stance which Hamas has verbally taken.
Ismail Haniyeh, a senior figure of Hamas, stated in 2008 that: “A Palestinian state will not be created at this time except in the territories of 1967.”  Likewise, Mesha’al said in an interview with the New York Times in 2009 that: “We are with a state on the 1967 borders, based on a long-term truce. This includes East Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.”
Analysts, including the renowned Robert Fisk, have argued that the acknowledging of the 1967 lines implicitly indicates that Hamas recognises Israel as a state, alongside a Palestinian one. Indeed, these words would need to turn into action by Hamas and the question of whether they would stick to any agreement has rightly been raised; especially due to other armed Islamist-factions in Gaza who would not accept any potential peace-treaty. It is highly unlikely that any future peace-talks would involve Israel and the PA, along with Hamas, until Tel Aviv’s demands that the ruling faction of Gaza relinquish violence and recognise Israel’s right to exist; while Hamas’ calls for the end to the blockade of Gaza are not likely to succeed in the near future. For Hamas to sit at the negotiating table with Israel, it would first need to put down its arms, and adopt non-violent resistance to Israel’s blockade of Gaza and occupation of Palestinian territory.
Netanyahu in the US
Notably, the US President Barack Obama recently stated, during a highly anticipated speech on the Middle East, that the basis of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians should be upon the 1967 lines with mutual land swaps.  Netanyahu reacted with defiance and stated at a press conference in the White House that the 1967 borders were “indefensible”.  In addition, as Netanyahu addressed both the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) – the strongest pro-Israel lobby in the US – and Congress, he laid out various conditions to any peace negotiations with the Palestinians. These received many large standing ovations from the members of the house, forcing Obama to clarify his statements at the annual AIPAC meeting.
However, Obama’s stance should not have come as a shock since past negotiations had been based around 1967 borders with agreed land swaps.  The release of the ‘Palestine Papers’ obtained by Al Jazeera clearly highlighted this.  The papers recorded detailed accounts of how Saeb Erekat, the chief negotiator of the PA, offered Israel the “biggest Jerusalem in history”.  The papers revealed the lengths to which the PA were willing to go in obtaining a Palestinian state, offering Israel large Jewish settlements in the heart of the West Bank and most of East Jerusalem in exchange for land surrounding the Gaza Strip.
As Netanyahu addressed Congress, however, he insisted that Jerusalem would not be divided.  East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory under International Law and the Palestinian people see this as their future capital.  In addition, the Israeli Prime Minister also laid out a number of other conditions.  These included a refusal to allow any Palestinian refugees back to Israeli land and a continuous military presence in the Jordan Valley.
This followed stalled negotiations that had begun in September 2010.  The PA withdrew from those talks owing to an escalation of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, after a previous moratorium expired and was not extended by Israeli officials.
The reaction of close aides to Abbas to the declaration made by Netanyahu has suggested that the Palestinians no longer believe that Israel is a viable partner in peace.  Erekat said: “I don’t think we can talk about a peace process with a man who says Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel, undivided, and he does not want a single [Palestinian] refugee to go back.  What is left to negotiate?” Abbas has stated that “Our option is still negotiation [with Israel], but it seems that because of conditions imposed by Netanyahu… we have no choice but to use the UN to get recognition of our state.  We are serious in our decision to use the UN, it is not manoeuvring… we will do it unless Netanyahu accepts to begin negotiations today on a substantial basis.”
Palestinian Statehood Bid 
Abbas and the PA are due to approach the United Nations in September to seek recognition of a Palestinian state based upon the 1967 borders, and membership of the General Assembly. Obama has cautioned against this, arguing that only negotiations will yield a durable solution.
The PA has been working on their diplomatic relations with various nations in order to persuade world leaders who have not already recognised the Arab state to do so.  Many South American countries recognised Palestine as a state in 2010, whilst EU leaders are said to be pondering over the idea.  Nicholas Sarkozy, the French President, stated recently: “If the peace process is still dead in September, France will face up to its responsibilities on the central question of recognition of a Palestinian state.”   In addition, the Arab League has also given their backing to the PA in seeking UN recognition of a state.
In order for the Palestinians to become a member of the UN, they would need recommendation from the Security Council.  However, according to the President of the UN General Assembly Joseph Deiss, if the US or another permanent member of the Council were to use their veto, the Assembly would be unable to vote on membership for the proposed state of Palestine.  Deiss was recently asked if the Palestinians would be accepted for UN membership level if the Security Council resolution is vetoed.  In response, he stated “No.”
Whilst Obama recently declared that the revolting Arab populations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and others deserve democracy in their respected lands, the stance towards independence, self determination and democracy for Palestinians has differed.  He has advised the Palestinians to not seek UN recognition in September to avoid Israel becoming isolated in the international community, whilst reiterating the need for peace talks to reignite.  Nabil Shaath, a senior PA official, stated in regards to a possible veto by Obama and the US: “We still hope that he will not do so, and that he will not stand in our way to freedom and independence, which he called for all the Arab nations.”
The post The ‘Salam/Shalom’ Process appeared first on Fair Observer.
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		https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/state-palestine/
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		Tue, 28 Jun 2011 15:31:52 +0000
				
		
		
		

					A brief background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Abbas seeks to gain UN recognition.

Following the withdrawal of the British from Mandate Palestine, the UN vote on the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (along with the subsequent rejection of this by Arab nations) and the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, the Middle East has been characterised by ongoing conflict up to the present day, involving war, uprisings and acts of terrorism. 
The post The State of Palestine? appeared first on Fair Observer.
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A brief background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Abbas seeks to gain UN recognition.
Following the withdrawal of the British from Mandate Palestine, the UN vote on the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (along with the subsequent rejection of this by Arab nations) and the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, the Middle East has been characterised by ongoing conflict up to the present day, involving war, uprisings and acts of terrorism. 
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, involving Israel and many neighbouring Arab countries, approximately 700-750,000 Palestinians were either forcefully expelled and/or had to flee their homes. 
The UN Resolution 194 states: “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so”. Israel contests what has come to be called the ‘right of return’, arguing that it would, if implemented in full, end the Jewish character of the state.
Wars continued to occur between Israel and their Arab neighbours, following 1948, including with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Palestinian fighters.  During the 1967 six day war, Israel conquered East Jerusalem (which they later annexed), the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai and the Golan Heights.  The Sinai was later returned to Egypt following the signing of a peace treaty by Anwar el-Sadat prior to his assassination. Gaza saw the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers and settlers in 2005, but was later blockaded by Israel and Egypt from 2007. The Golan Heights is also considered occupied territory and was seized from Syria in the 1967 War.
The UN considers the lands seized in 1967 by Israel to be occupied territories, whilst UN Resolution 242 also demands the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent [1967] conflict” and the recognition of every state’s “right to live in peace within secure and recognizable boundaries”.             
Despite the peace treaties between Egypt and Jordan with Israel, peace between the Palestinians and Israelis has remained distant.  Following attempts to achieve peace by past US presidents, which peaked during the historic 2002 Camp David Summit bringing together Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, Barack Obama failed in September 2010. Notably, past negotiations have often seen both sides blame each other for the breakdown of talks. The negotiations of 2010 between the Israelis and Palestinians quickly broke down following the expiration of a freeze of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Israel has settlements in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank which are classed as illegal under international law. 
The Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by President Mahmoud Abbas governs small portions of the West Bank whilst the land and sea blockaded Gaza is run by Hamas.  Following the 2006 elections, which saw an overwhelming victory for Hamas, a brief but bitter civil war broke out between Hamas and Fatah (the main faction to make up the PA).  This resulted in a West Bank governed by Fatah, whilst Hamas seized Gaza, which meant the two main factions were at political odds.  However, the split Palestinian factions agreed to sign a preliminary unity pact in 2011, following the beginnings of the Arab Uprisings earlier in the year. Notably, the Gaza Strip saw the withdrawal of the Israeli military and settlers in 2005, but was later blockaded by Israel and Egypt in 2007. 
Israel, the US and EU nations consider Hamas to be a terrorist organisation, with whom they cannot enter peace talks. Other states, such as Turkey, Russia, and Switzerland, do not formally consider Hamas a terrorist organisation.  The Israeli government holds the view that peace talks with the political faction Hamas are impossible because the latter has in the past, and in its charter, called for the destruction of Israel. Israel also contends that Hamas does not acknowledge the state’s right to exist. However, this has been disputed by Hamas officials such as Khaled Mesha'al, the Islamist group's leader.
Meanwhile amidst the indefinitely stalled peace talks with Israel, due to settlement construction and Palestinian pre-conditions of a renewed moratoriam on settlements, Abbas has decided to seek UN recognition of a Palestinian state based upon the 1967 borders in the coming September.  The borders of the 1967 territories include East Jerusalem – which the Palestinian people see as their future capital – the West Bank and Gaza.  Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama have warned Abbas against taking such actions, to avoid Israel becoming isolated in the international community. They argue that the borders of a future Palestinian state (and, by implication, Israel) ought to result from a process of negotiation. Both the US and Israel have threatened the PA, though it appears likely to proceed.
The post The State of Palestine? appeared first on Fair Observer.
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